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THE THEORY OF FORMS IN PLATO'S LATER DIALOGUES

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

by

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JUNE, 1965

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Theory of Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues, submitted by Roger A. Shiner in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

In this thesis, I try to give stronger reasons than have been given so far for accepting the notion that Plato abandoned the Theory of Transcendent Forms after the period of the middle dialogues. My argument is based on an evaluation of the philosophical issues involved; I argue that there are definite faults in the Theory of Forms, and that the relevant passages in the critical dialogues are explicable as directed against the Theory, prompted by Plato's having become aware of these faults.

Chapter 1 consists of a general introduction to the problem, and to my treatment of it. Chapter 2 is a discussion of the general philosophical points involved, and in Chapter 3, I show Plato in the difficulties outlined in Chapter 2. Chapters 4 to 6 are an interpretation of the critical dialogues, according to the same pattern. In Chapter 7, I account for some prima facie evidence that in a late dialogue the Theory re-appears. Chapter 8 offers a concluding summary of the argument.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the two scholars, under whom I have worked on the general area covered by this thesis, Mr. Renford Bambrough of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Prof. John Malcolm of the University of Alberta. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Malcolm; the encouragement and helpful criticisms that I have received from him, in his role as my Supervisor for this thesis, have been invaluable. None but myself is responsible for the errors that yet remain in it.

My thanks are also due to Mrs. Jean Kemp, for typing out the final version, and to my wife, for all her patience, while the mountains laboured and brought forth their mouse.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is the report of a journey over very familiar countryside; it has been photographed and painted in wide landscape studies, and in great detail; it has been mapped at ten inches to one mile, and one mile to ten inches. The originality of this thesis lies, therefore, not in its subject, but in the perspective from which its subject is viewed. I attempt to present in a new light the old problem of the development of Plato's philosophy in the period following the publication of the Phaedrus, the period of the 'critical' dialogues, the Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist. I will be concerned more or less entirely with those three dialogues, and two others, the Timaeus and the Philebus; the latter was certainly written after the Sophist, while the date of the former is more difficult to assess. I assume in this thesis that it is to be dated before the Parmenides, a theory already put forward by Owen (vid. Owen (1)); I support this assumption only by showing how easily it fits the line of development that I am expounding.

The developmental problem here is well-known; after the middle period, in which Plato enthusiastically propounds the Theory of Forms as the cure of all philosophical ills, and some non-philosophical ones too, he apparently turns to criticising the theory, and to the question of whether the need it supplied might not be supplied in other ways. This in itself is no problem, but, despite the severity, and lack of formal reply to the criticisms,

the Theory of Forms re-appears in all its former glory in the Timaeus, traditionally almost the last of Plato's writings, and is hinted at in the Philebus. The first question to be considered, therefore, in attempting to resolve this problem, is whether or not the arguments that are brought, in the Parmenides especially, against the Theory of Forms are valid arguments against it. If they are not, while there is still the residual matter of accounting for their presence, the main objection to accepting the traditional account is gone. If, however, they are valid, we must look for hints that Plato knew they were; the fact that he made them is strongly indicative here. If the arguments are both valid, and known by Plato to be valid, then the Timaeus and the Philebus have to be accounted for. The Timaeus is so much in the spirit of the middle dialogues, that the only course open is that taken by Owen, namely to dispute the traditional date, and place the Timaeus instead in the middle period. The Philebus is in a different category; it is indisputably late,* and the references to the Theory of Forms are somewhat oblique. But still, some explanation must be given.

In this thesis, I treat of the developmental problem in the following way. I argue that there are certain deficiencies in the Theory of Forms, as a philosophical theory; that Plato became aware of them, chiefly because they are more clearly evident in the Timaeus, the last dialogue of the middle period, than anywhere else; that he expunged the unsatisfactory elements of the theory, while retaining other important aspects of it; finally, that the apparent references in the later dialogues are to this purified version, not

* See Note at the end of this chapter.

to the original version of the middle dialogues.

The details of my account are as follows. In the second chapter of the thesis, I discuss in general terms the logical features of a certain type of dualism, which I am calling a choristic dualism. I shall suggest that there are deficiencies in a choristic dualism, which make it impossible to defend such a theory consistently. As examples of the points in question, I deal with aspects of the philosophies of Descartes and Joseph Butler, as well as of Plato. In the third chapter, I show these problems coming to a head in the Timaeus, where Plato is forced to oscillate between two incompatible theses, both of which, by his choristic dualism, he is committed to holding.

In the remainder of the thesis, I go on to consider what I am saying is Plato's own criticism of his earlier theory; my case is that this criticism is based on the arguments that can in fact be brought against a choristic dualism, such as the Theory of Forms. As regards the two arguments based on finding an infinite regress entailed by the dualism, found in the Parmenides, there has been a great deal of discussion among scholars as to whether they are valid. Since it would undermine my entire thesis, if they are not valid, I devote the fourth chapter to showing that they are valid, and that some recent attempts to deny this are inadequate. In the next chapter, I examine the criticism of the Theory of Forms brought by Parmenides; I consider firstly how the Third Man Arguments, given that their formal structure is as I stated in the previous chapter, show Plato's concern with certain problematic aspects of his choristic dualism. I secondly show how the 'Mastership' objection shows

him concerned with others. In the sixth chapter, I treat of the discussion in the Sophist between the Eleatic Stranger, the Materialists and the 'Friends of the Forms' in a similar manner.

All these chapters are intended to point to the general conclusion that Plato became aware of the difficulties in the Theory of Forms arising from its being a choric dualism; this qualification is important, and cannot be stressed enough. What Plato gives up after the critical period is this absolute division between the Two Worlds, the χωρισμός, no less, but equally, no more. There are not the same problems in maintaining some more innocent distinction. Accordingly, in the seventh chapter, I account for the appearance in the Philebus of the same linguistic terms as appear in the middle period, particularly the language of γένεσις and οὐσία, Becoming and Being. The concluding chapter contains a summary of the argument. In the bibliography, I list all the works that I have made specific use of in the writing of this thesis; not all of these are referred to in the body of the text. References to the bibliography are in the body of the text, not footnotes, and take the form of a citation of the author's name only, followed by a number, in cases where there is more than one work listed under his or her name. In the first appendix, I give reasons for omitting any consideration of the dialogue Cratylus, whose content might be thought to make that work relevant to the subject-matter of this thesis. The second appendix takes the form of a prolonged footnote on Passmore's interpretation of the Theory of Forms: the length of the note and its content make it unsuitable

for inclusion in the body of the text.

What I am claiming as original is the systematic study of the relevant passages in the dialogues from Timaeus to Philebus, explicitly from the perspective of seeing the Theory of Forms as a choristic dualism, but there has been little attempt to relate what is known about the formal structure of such arguments to what Plato says about the formal structure of the Theory of Forms. The narrow questions, of the validity of the various critical arguments, and what Plato might or might not have been doing when he wrote the dialogues in question, appear more easily soluble, when seen in this perspective. The philosophical ramifications of any philosophical theory are always of importance in philosophical evaluation; I am suggesting that here is one place where they are relevant to a vexed issue of interpretation, I would even suggest that the issue is vexed, precisely because the philosophical issues have been largely ignored or misunderstood.

NOTE

The relative date of the Philebus, as being one of Plato's last writings, can be fixed, independently of its philosophical content, by means of stylometric criteria. Certain dialogues can be grouped together, by measuring the incidence of various stylistic quirks; Owen (1), pp. 79-82 and Cherniss (1), pp. 227-233 are the source of references to many of these analyses, and all writers are in agreement over the date of the Philebus. Since one point of controversy in the development issue is the date of the Timaeus, attempts have been made to use stylometric criteria to determine that date, and it might be thought surprising that I propose to make no reference to them. I do, however, have reason for this omission, not the least being that, as a philosopher, I do not have the necessary expertise to make any worthwhile evaluation of such criteria. In the second place, insofar as I am able to form an opinion, it seems to me, on the basis of the debate between Cherniss and Owen on the subject, the criteria are ambivalent on the matter

of dating the Timaeus; some favour the early date, others the latter, there is no conclusive evidence in favour of either. It is also relevant to point out that the Timaeus is schematically unusual, so it is possible that the usual stylometric criteria cannot be used in any case.

But what is surely most important, is that we are concerned with the development of a philosopher's thought. If it is possible, and I shall be arguing that it is, to trace a philosophically coherent development, only on very strong evidence ought we to ignore this possibility and conclude that Plato was philosophically naive. In particular, one would need very strong evidence indeed, where that evidence is based solely on his style of writing.

I put that forward as a principle that is a priori true. I do not think that the disparity in this case is such as to constitute an extreme situation. I do wish to register a formal caveat against exaggerated emphasis on the value of stylistic as opposed to philosophical criteria as interpretative tools.

CHAPTER II

TWO WORLDS ARGUMENTS AND THE CHORISTIC DUALISM

I want now to proceed to discuss the wider background, against which the examination of the critical dialogues should be set. Parmenides is able to find these difficulties in the Theory of Forms, not because of its individual characteristics, but because it is a choristic dualism. The defects of the Theory of Forms can be stated in quite general terms; the Theory of Forms itself is typical, formally, of a choristic dualism; Parmenides' arguments against it typical of a type of argument in philosophy called 'Two Worlds Arguments' (TWAs). These facts first came to my notice during a reading of Passmore's book (cf. Passmore, Cap.III); there he notes a trend to what he calls 'existence monism', as opposed to dualist theories like Plato's or Descartes', and suggests

"The convergence on existence monism arises, because philosophers have come to accept as unanswerable a particular philosophical argument, which I have called the 'two worlds' argument..... Its basic point is that, once we break up any system in a certain way, it becomes quite impossible to put the pieces together again in a single situation; and yet, unless they can be so put together, the whole point of the breaking-up is lost".

(ib, pp 40)

I owe the original inspiration to work at the development problem from this angle to a reading of Passmore's book, but I have come to disagree with the way that he applies his general thesis to the Theory of Forms (cf. Appendix II). The basic point, that what Parmenides offers is a typical TWA against a typical choristic dualism, I, as said, do accept.

Let me first set out the points in general terms. At the

bottom of any choristic dualism there is a logical distinction of some sort, but the dualism itself always magnifies the distinction. For example, one may make a distinction between two modes of cognition, perceptual knowledge and conceptual knowledge, between mental events and physical events, between concepts and their instantiations. One may talk of 'degrees of reality' in these contexts, again with nothing sinister involved--for example, 'Numbers are more real than sense-data' may merely be a way of indicating that Phenomenalism is false; 'Mind is more real than matter', that Behaviorism is false; 'Concepts are more real than their instantiations', that Nominalism is false. But a choristic dualism does not involve distinctions of this possibly innocent type, for it makes the difference between the two categories, the two worlds, not one of mere degree, but absolute: there are no connections between the two at all.

It is not to be thought that it is a mere matter of taste whether or not the distinction is absolute; entirely the reverse is true. One might use a medical metaphor, and say that complete isolation is necessary, to avoid any possibility of cross-infection. The distinction is made absolute, as a means of preserving it in all possible circumstances, and a philosopher who does not set out to make it absolute betrays insufficient understanding of what it is to resort to a choristic dualism. For a second world or category is intended to cover parts of the phenomena to be explained, which the hypothesis of one world or category leaves unaccounted for. Usually, but not always, evaluations are introduced; the first world does not merely happen to fail, it possesses a positive defect, which causes the failure: the second world does not possess the defect, it

succeeds where the other fails, so it has every right to be thought superior. If the second world were not made altogether separate, whence would come its superior explanatory power? What could it do, that some extended and improved version of the first could not do? To be effective, a two-worlds thesis has to keep the two worlds absolutely distinct.

Such are the reasons for the existence and nature of choristic dualisms, and yet Passmore implies that there is in comparatively recent philosophy a convergence away from them and towards monisms, because of certain unanswerable arguments against any two-worlds thesis. Let me try and expand Passmore's cryptic description of these arguments, continuing from the point reached at the end of the previous paragraph. It was there stressed that an appeal to a choristic dualism was for a purpose, for dealing with necessary explananda as yet unexplained. It was stressed that for this reason, the dualism had to be choristic. Yet the consequences of this is that there can be no commerce between the two worlds, no connexion or interaction between them. If the two worlds are defined, such that they can have no common ground, then they can never meet; here, this is a necessary state of affairs, unlike its counterpart in international politics. The consequence of this is that the purpose of appealing to a choristic dualism cannot be achieved, for that purpose was, from an association of the two worlds, to make complete what would otherwise be merely partial. Certainly, one no longer has one incomplete part; but two parts that can never be joined still do not make a whole.

So then, we have a situation which, for the philosopher contemplating the employment of a choristic dualism, is somewhat embarrassing. He can only achieve his end, by following both of two logically incompatible courses of action. He has to argue both that his dualism is absolute, and that it is not, in order to use it to complete his explanation. There is a typical way of attempting to get out of this impasse, the introduction of what Passmore (ib., pp. 45) calls a 'bridge-entity': the image is one of U Thant frantically scurrying back and forth between Moscow and Washington. In this way, it is hoped, the separation and the connexion can be obtained at once. However this move still fails, but the ways in which it might fail differ according to the variations there can be in the original choristic dualism. These differences need to be carefully distinguished, and it is a fault in Passmore's account that they remain largely conflated; he calls down a general plague on all bridge-entities and leaves it at that. The first possibility is that, because of the particular nature of the theory in question, the bridge-entity must fall into one of the two categories, and therefore cannot be a bridge-entity at all. I emphasise the particularity here for a reason, because it is not the case that this move is valid against all choristic dualisms; it might be the case that the bridge-entity does not have to fall into one of the two worlds. Whether the dualism fails in this way or no is consequent on, not antecedent to the particular type of worlds and entities involved. What I mean by this will become clearer when I give some specific examples, and also when I pass to my next point.

The next possibility is that the bridge-entity is defined as sharing characteristics of both worlds, so that it can have commerce with either. The objection to this is that it entirely undermines the hypothesis that there have to be two separate worlds. If the two worlds peacefully co-exist within the bridge-entity, why must they be kept separate elsewhere? Alternatively, if they must be kept separate elsewhere, why are they allowed to co-exist in the bridge-entity? The final possibility is a slight variation on this latter one; the bridge-entity is outside the two categories altogether, but is capable of being in some way related to both. The problem here is that each of the two sets of relations involved must be within one or the other of the worlds, and so there is still the problem of how the two relations involved can meet in the bridge-entity. One might argue that the bridge-entity has itself two aspects, which can make it mediate; then, however, the alternatives are the same as those enunciated in the treatment of the second possibility.

We have then the following bare bones of a choristic dualism and the TWA against it. An absolute distinction is made, but has to be broken down; if the distinction is broken down, then it cannot also be retained--this is a logical truism. The TWA argues that this logical truism is necessarily violated by any choristic dualism, and therefore is justly, I think, said to constitute an unanswerable objection to any such theory. Various fleshy covers are added to this skeleton, and these produce variations on the theme of choristic dualisms and TWAs, but the general

affinities are there. Let us now consider three such particular examples, the Cartesian dualism of Mind and Matter, the Butlerian distinction of Conscience and the Passions, and, finally, some preliminary remarks on the Platonic distinction of Knowledge and Belief.

Descartes' original absolute distinction is between corporeal matter and incorporeal mind, or extended and thinking substance (cf. Medit.iii, I. pp. 165). However, he sees that this hypothesis of two absolutely distinct substances, while it accounts for some otherwise paradoxical phenomena, does not account for certain other facts, of which he is very clearly aware, typified by the case that, when he is hurt, a physical event, he feels pain, a mental event. He therefore assumes that there must be a 'union and apparent intermingling of mind and body', that he is not lodged in his body merely as a pilot in a ship, but is very closely united to it (cf. Medit.vi, ib., pp. 192). He then goes on to argue that this intermingling of body and soul takes place in the pineal gland, a small gland in the brain. (cf. ib. pp.196; Principles CXCVI, I, pp. 293; Passions of the Soul, Art.xxxi-xxxiv, pp. I.345-7, esp. xxxiv)

In relation to the general outline, we see Descartes postulating the two distinct substances, in order to account for certain phenomena, and then forced to attempt a softening of the dualism, in order to offer a complete account. His specification of the bridge-entity falls into the first of the three possibilities

that I distinguished. (pp.10) Since Descartes' dualism is exhaustive, all substances must be either thinking or extended; the pineal gland must be either thinking or extended substance. One does not need to argue that it is obviously extended, and so cannot have any connexion with a thinking substance; there is an argument logically prior to that, namely, that, in an exhaustive dualism, it must be one or the other, and, one substance being corporeal, the other incorporeal, whichever it is, it cannot interact with the other. If Descartes were to allow that, even though the pineal gland is extended substance, it can interact with thinking substance, then the choristic dualism is gone. Descartes however does not seem to appreciate the nature and size of the hornets' nest that he has stirred up.

The choristic dualism appears in Butler as the basis of his moral philosophy. He begins the Preface to the Rolls sermons thus:-

"There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from enquiring into the abstract nature of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature..... The following Discourses proceed chiefly in this latter method. The first two wholly."

(Butler, I, pp. 181)

The parts he distinguishes are 'a natural principle of benevolence, which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the individual', (Sermon I, pp. 197-9); 'several passions and affections' (ib., pp. 199-201); 'a principle of reflexion (called Conscience) in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their

own actions' (ib., pp. 201-3). Conscience and the other passions are opposed to one another; the former is superior to and incompatible with the latter (Preface, pp. 187). However, these parts on their own cannot produce the moral life; the overall source thereof is self-love/benevolence, which allies itself (ib., pp. 192) with any of the other principles to produce actions. True self-love will ally itself constantly with Conscience, for to do anything else 'is not to act conformably to the constitution of man'. (ib., pp. 187)

This theory can be broken down into the same general form. Among the passions of the soul ('passions' being used in the old purely descriptive sense), there is a distinction between Conscience and the rest. Butler's particular moral outlook leads him to make this distinction absolute and evaluative. Obviously, to suggest either part on its own to be an adequate account of moral phenomena will be mistaken. But, if Conscience is supremely rational, and the rest totally disassociated from it, whence comes the complete spectrum of actions that one finds not only from individual to individual, but within the life of the same individual? This problem is solved by the postulation of the third principle, self-love/benevolence, which mediates between Conscience and the other passions, and controls the influence that each has in the moral life. There we have the distinction which, to fulfil its purpose of explaining the phenomena, must necessarily be absolute, and necessarily be broken down. The bridge-entity operates by being at times rational and at times 'passionate', if I may be

permitted to put it like that: this makes Butler's dualism equivalent to the second possibility that I listed. (pp.11) But, if self-love can be either one or the other, does this not either reduplicate or dissolve the problem of bridging the gap between Conscience and the other passions? If, because of the gap, man cannot be related to both, how can self-love do any better? On the other hand, if self-love can bridge the gap without any trouble, why was the gap created in the first place? Why not simply have man acting at times rationally and at times passionately? Again, we have a distinction which has to be both made and broken down; and, if a bridge-entity is introduced, we have the reduplication/dissolution obstacle to circumvent.

I come now to apply this general structure to Plato. He believes that the sensible world is in constant flux, and that this instability entails that no entity in the sensible world can ever be the object of knowledge, for knowledge is always of that which is unchanging. He therefore postulates a choristic dualism between (a) the sensible world, experienced through the body (Phaedo) or the parts of the soul associated with the body (cf. Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus), the object of belief, and (b) the real world of the Forms, absolutely distinct and transcendent, experienced through the soul (cf. Phdo) or through its rational part (cf. Rep, Phdr, and Tim), the object of knowledge. The Forms must be absolutely transcendent, if they are to be rid of all taints of the phenomenal flux; yet some communion with them must be achieved, for it is to enable man to live rightly in this world that the Forms are

introduced. There are the first two points in the general structure. Plato attempts to obviate them with the soul, his bridge-entity: the soul has a rational part, which enables it to know the Forms, and lower parts, which enable it to have commerce with the sensible world, even though it is not itself, being not an object of knowledge, a part of either. Plato therefore represents the third possibility. (pp. 11) There is, however, the usual difficulty, the problem is either reduplicated or dissolved. If there has to be an absolute distinction between the respective pairs of cognitive agents and objects, Reason directed at the Forms, and the lower parts at the sensible particulars, then this distinction must be retained, even though the agents concerned are parts of one and the same entity, the soul, even though the soul is supposedly bridging the gap. Alternatively, if there can legitimately be relations between the two worlds inside the soul, it cannot have been necessary to introduce the two worlds in the first place, as in Butler's case also. (pp. 11, 15)

What I have been doing in this chapter is arguing that there is a certain broad general form common to any choristic dualism, that a philosopher employing such a theory has to make certain types of moves. Secondly, there is a certain broad general argument, rightly termed unanswerable against any such theory. This takes the form of showing that the choristic dualist is necessarily committed to following both of two logically incompatible courses of action. If he attempts to evade this obstacle, by having recourse to a bridge-entity, other unavoidable difficulties occur. I have tended to set this out in terms of successive moves by one side or the

other, whereas, in each case, we have the choristic dualism presented complete with bridge-entity. The earlier moves ought then to be thought of as imaginary discussions of the philosopher concerned with himself. In the case of Plato, I am now going on to suggest that, in the critical dialogues, he did make the final, destructive moves against his earlier self.

CHAPTER III

DIFFICULTIES IN THE TIMAEUS

I shall be arguing in this chapter that Plato finds himself in difficulties in the Timaeus, as a result of being forced at one and the same time to push through consistently his choristic dualism, and yet having to ignore it. The symptom of these difficulties is the importance and role of Necessity in the creation and ordering of the world by the Demiurge. Plato argues in 47e-48e that there are two elements involved in creation; firstly, Reason, which is exemplified in the Demiurge, who is perfect and benevolent, and works from a model which is itself perfect (cf. 28); secondly, Necessity, exemplified in the raw materials with which the Demiurge has to operate, for he does not create out of nothing. We see from the description that Plato has given earlier (28b2-29b1) that creation comes about by the Demiurge fashioning the raw materials into a copy of the eternal model of the world. Because he is good, he makes the copy as like as possible to the original, yet, because the created world is only a copy, it cannot be perfectly like the model, it must in some way be imperfect. In the later section, he explains the imperfection as the result of Necessity, or the Errant Cause. This absolves him of the problem of reconciling the imperfection, to which he is committed by one higher principle, the axiological aspect of his metaphysical dualism, with the supremacy of benevolent reason, to which he is committed for like reasons.

It might be thought possible to drive a wedge here between

the imperfection that arises, because the copy is a copy, and the imperfection that arises, because the copy has as one factor in its creation the work of Necessity. In particular, it might seem that Time, which is the created and imperfect copy of eternity, has only the first imperfection, and not the second. But I think that this line of thought is mistaken. It must be borne in mind that, for the Greeks, creatio ex nihilo could not occur, so the idea of creation was tied very closely to that of the raw material out of which the creature was created; this means that the likelihood of the raw material playing a significant metaphysical role is high. Plato's Weltanschauung leads him to represent creation as the victory of perfection over imperfection; yet the element of imperfection cannot be removed altogether, because, while the created and temporal not only can but should strive towards the standards of the uncreated and eternal, it can never reach them, just because of its temporality. Cosmic perfection and cosmic imperfection, the Demiurge and the works of Necessity are exactly balanced here; to drive a wedge between the imperfection of Necessity and that of a copy would entail driving a wedge between the perfection of supreme Reason and that of eternal Reality. That cannot be done, and neither can the former. Time fits happily into this framework, if one takes careful note of how it is that Time comes into existence. Plato describes the creation of Time at 37d5ff., and he calls it εἰκὼ κινητὸν αἰῶνος, 'a moving image of eternity'. It has been maintained that this 'beginning of Time' cannot be meant literally, but Vlastos (cf. Vlastos (1), pp. 74-7) argues convincingly the reverse. Plato reductively defines Time as a function of the movements of the

heavenly bodies, as no more than measured Time; therefore there was no time, before there were heavenly bodies moving in regular sequences, and they were created along with everything else in the general imposition of order on the disorderly motion. For this reason, the works of Necessity are a significant part of the constitution of Time, as they are for anything else in this world. It is therefore as much the case for Time as for anything else that the putatively two imperfections are one.

In passing on now to examine the difficulties that there are in this description of creation, we must first establish what is the meaning of Necessity in this context. It is tempting to think of Necessity as implying a reference to the transempirical timelessness of the laws of nature, to the fact that, try as he may, the Demiurge cannot but respect them. But this is not a concept of Necessity which the Greeks ever possessed (cf. Balme); the operations of Necessity were not equated with, but contrasted with the laws of nature; the latter were the work of Reason, and anything that was not so explicable was characterised as a surd event, a necessary event. But even to talk of 'the laws of nature' is slightly misleading, because of the modern connotations of the term; it is doubtful that the Greeks were aware of the sophistications of 'All known As are Bs', 'All As are Bs', and 'All As must be Bs'. The contrast between Reason and Necessity seems to be one between an event that can be explained in some rational manner, and one that cannot be so explained, in some fairly naive, common-sense meaning of those terms; there are no Humean overtones of 'inductive

explanations are not explanations'.

This is the sort of point being overlooked by Taylor (cf. Taylor (1)) and Archer-Hind in their commentaries on this passage. To them, as to anyone of our day and age, the contrast between events that are explicable and events that are not, except in certain highly specialised usages, (e.g., biological emergence or theoretical physics,) just is not a workable contrast, unless unpacked into one between events that are at the present time explicable, and events that are in principle explicable, but at the present time remain obscure. Taylor and Archer-Hind argue that this is the contrast that Plato is wishing to draw by his distinction of Reason and Necessity; but it presupposes a picture of deterministic natural laws, which the Greeks just did not have. An unexplained event was, or very well might be, an inexplicable event in the literal sense of the word, an irrational event; it may have been the occasion for traumatic experiences for some philhellenes, when The Greeks and the Irrational was published, but no-one should underestimate after Dodds' invaluable and incomparably documented work the Greeks' conviction that irrational forces exist and influence the world; it was as deep-rooted as any of their beliefs in the power of reason. Necessary events are mysterious, but they are not in principle explicable; nor is this notion surprising, when one considers the elementary state of Greek science even in the time of Plato. It is true that to say something is the result of Necessity is in a sense to explain it, and it is a point of contention how far the attribution of natural events to the

agency of irrational forces was intended as an explanation, or intended to be understood as an explanation, and how far it was a symbol of understood and acknowledged inexplicability. Either way, there is a contrast between necessary events, and events which are the result of reason, and that is as much as I need here.

That, however, is only one part of the picture; Necessity is the Errant Cause, and we have considered so far only why it is errant; we need now to examine why it is a cause. The answer to this has already been implied; the created world must in some degree be imperfect, but because the Demiurge is perfectly good, no imperfections can be the result of rational action on his part, an action for which he is responsible. The imperfection has therefore to result from some other agency, and this, we are told, is Necessity: it is the cause of the world's imperfection, of this limitation on the power of the Demiurge. The consequence of this is that Necessity cannot be random in some strictly indeterministic sense; the raw materials that the Demiurge has to accept as given must have some identifiable properties, for these it is that he makes the best possible use of in the creation of the world. At least some quasi-Humean statements of the form 'Given A, we can expect B' must be true of necessary events. If this were not the case, then his raw materials would be of no use to the Demiurge.

The creation of the world Plato describes as the imposition of order on chaos within this metaphysical framework. But there are still difficulties in this description, and these can be best brought out, by considering one attempt more recent than those of Taylor and Archer-Hind, to unpack this vague account of the

creation procedure in terms that moderns can understand. Morrow (cf. Bibliography) argues that the world of Necessity consists of necessary (in the appropriate sense) causal sequences producing necessary events, and chance events, which are produced by the intersection of these causal sequences; what the Demiurge does is juggle these causal sequences, so that sequences we have no reason to regard as necessarily connected with each other do occur together, and occur regularly together, producing events which could only result from their collective occurrence. Allowing for the pictorial element in the language, Morrow does manage to retain the idea of the world of Necessity being not indeterminate, and yet leave a task for the Demiurge which would not be performed without him; exactly this, it seems, is what Plato is trying to do. But then does this not make it paradoxical to refer to the pre-Demiurgic state as one of ἀταξία, 'disorder', and what was then visible as being οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον, ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, 'not at rest, but moving without any pattern or order'? (30s4-5) This seems in contrast with the finished product, very much more than a distinction between two different sets of interlocking causal sequences. How then can we account for what is going on here?

One could argue that the use of this strong language to describe the pre-existing chaos is a persuasive definition on the part of Plato, to bring out what for him is a vast and vital difference between the condition of the world before and after the intervention of the Demiurge, a difference which those with less, in Morrow's words, 'cosmic faith' would be inclined to gloss over.

But when the details of the description of the Receptacle of Becoming are examined, it should be clear that those are not purely emotive, but that, when Plato says 'disorderly motion', he means it. Plato's purpose in the Timaeus is to present a teleological conception of the world, to present it as being designed by Benevolent Reason to function in the best possible manner, to fulfil as best as possible its ἀρετή of being a world. Therefore the field of action of Reason has to be as wide as it possibly can be. This is exemplified by his criticism of the orthodox Pre-Socratic type of cosmology at 48b3-c2:-

"We must in fact consider in itself the nature of fire and water, earth and air, before the generation of the Heaven, and their condition before the Heaven was. For to this day, no-one has explained their generation, but we speak as if men knew what fire and each of the others is, positing them as original principles, elements (as it were, letters) of the universe; whereas one who has ever so little intelligence should not rank them in this analogy even as low as syllables."

(tr. Cornford)

To postulate the four elements as primary Plato regards as heretical, because then the influence of Reason is radically diminished. A second objection to this postulation is brought at 49a6-50a4; the initial state of chaos has been described as the state of Becoming, and this has the consequence that

"It is hard to say, with respect to any one of these, which we ought to call really water rather than fire, or indeed which we should call by any given name, rather than by all the names together or by each severally, so as to use language in a sound and trustworthy way."

(49b2-5, tr. Cornford)

In the initial state of the world, no statements of the form 'That

is X', where X is anything but the Receptacle, can be true; therefore it is not permissible to identify even the four elements as being there at the beginning of the world. Plato further argues at 51a3 that the Receptacle πάντων ἔκτος προσήκει πεφυκέναι τῶν εἰδῶν, and at 51a7, that it is ἀνορατὸν εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, 'is naturally without any characteristics at all....invisible and amorphous'.

We can see, therefore, in this account which he gives of the initial cosmological state, two notions uppermost, to both of which Plato is committed by his choristic dualism. The first notion is that the initial state must be bereft of all Being. The second notion is that the initial state must be thus, because of the ontological supremacy of Reason, and the entities that are akin to it; because of that, there could be nothing else that is, before Reason starts its toil.

That state certainly seems some way from the initial state as it is described by Morrow, and yet there are reasons why a Morrow-type account is needed; the problem is one that might be termed Plato's problem of theodicy. We still have the matter of explaining how the world comes to be imperfect, since, being in fact the world of Becoming itself, rather than in that world, imperfection is a necessary characteristic of it; only the eternal model from which it is copied is perfect. If it has to be imperfect, then there must be, as we saw above, some restriction on the operation of the Demiurge; otherwise, if the entire cosmos is the product of his craftsmanship, he will be responsible for the imperfection,

and that is unthinkable in one who is Benevolent Reason personified. The imperfection is therefore attributed to the works of Necessity; but those works must have some identity, in order that they can have characteristics which the Demiurge, though he cannot alter them, can manipulate for the best. We therefore find Plato arguing, in a Morrow-type fashion, at 52d2-53c3, that the Receptacle ἀνωμάλως πάντῃ ταλαντούμενην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἐκείνων αὐτήν, κινουμένην δ' αὖτε πάλιν ἐκεῖνα σείειν,

'but it was everywhere swayed unevenly shaken by these (sc. the appearances), and by its motion shook them in its turn'; that it shook the four kinds into cognate groups, that it could do this, because they ἔχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν ἀττά, παντάκασί γε μὴν διακείμενα, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἔχῃν ἄκαν ὅταν ἀπὸ τινὸς θεός, 'possessed some vestiges of their own nature, but were altogether in such a condition as we should expect for anything when deity is absent from it'; and, finally, that the god formed these traces into distinctive shapes (the itemised description of this process following at 53d-57d6).

This is, it is true, somewhat more vague than Morrow's account, but I call it a 'Morrow-type account', because it possesses a defect common to all such accounts, a defect clearly visible in Morrow's, but less so in Timaeus', and perhaps best indicated only by a comparison of the two. The problem is this, how can a balance be struck between giving the Demiurge as much Spielraum as possible, in order to argue for the rationality of the created world-order, and leaving a space for the works of Necessity, the surd elements outside the control of the Demiurge? Morrow overbalances in favour

of Necessity, and thus makes the Demiurge hardly worthy of his name; Plato initially overbalances the other way, and gives all the opportunities in the world, literally, to the Demiurge, but then realises he is faced with the problem of theodicy; if the world is utter chaos, an absolute indeterminate mass, then the Demiurge is responsible even for the minimal works of necessity. So he makes what seems an innocuous retraction, the four elements are there in vestigial form, the sort of condition one would expect before deity had worked on them. (53b2-4)

But will this move do? Vlastos (cf. Vlastos (1), pp. 77) describes it as:-

"a compromise.....the chaos is disorderly, but not altogether so; it contains 'some traces' of order. This is a makeshift. Even as a metaphor, it is self-contradictory, for 'traces' could only be a result, not an anticipation."

In other words, if this represents, as it must do, the initial stages in the imposition of order on chaos, then the work of the Demiurge has already started. If it does not represent such a stage, then Plato would have to give up the idea that there is no Being in the state of Becoming. We are talking here in terms of absolutes, either/or, and no compromises; either the choristic dualism, no Being at all in Becoming, or the solution of the problem of theodicy, some identifiable works of necessity; not both the dualism and the solution of the problem. Plato tries to have a compromise, but it can't be done; his attempt to have one is a symptom, not a solution of the problem, and it is a problem which is forced upon Plato by his choristic dualism. He has both to postulate and to deny identifiable traces of the four elements (for example) in his

first cosmological state, and this because of two principles, both equivalent consequences of his dualism. The traces have to be there, to account for the necessary imperfection of the created world; their existence must be denied, because, without the work of Reason, there can be nothing.

Vlastos adds on the same page two more points which are relevant to this discussion. Firstly, he suggests that the argument concerning the traces of the elements can be repeated in parallel concerning the creation of Time. The Demiurge cannot create the entire orderliness of Time, yet he has to be the all-powerful arranger. Plato would have to say that the pre-existing chaos shows traces of arithmetic periodicity, there is a 'vague, indefinite priority and succession in the temporal passage which is as yet destitute of chronological order'. What is more important is his final point in this section of his paper. He suggests that the whole notion of γένεσις is at fault, that Becoming, as it has to be in cosmological terms, is an impossibility; it is supposed to be bereft of any order at all, order being the cosmological equivalent of Reality, and yet the mere fact that it exists continuously, even in the most disorderly state, in space and time, constitutes it as a part of Reality. I propose to follow up this line of argument, and to consider the thesis of Cherniss that, on the contrary, we find in this passage a true theory of Becoming made possible.

Vlastos' point here is not, as it might be thought, that the existence of the world of Becoming causes the problem, for there is a clear distinction between 'existing' and 'being real';

Becoming can happily exist, as long as it is not real. (See Appendix II for discussion of a similar point in relation to the soul.) The point is that this existence is stable, eternal, unchanging, even though the qualifications of that existence are not; it has the characteristics of Reality, even though they do not. The existence of Becoming is real; it is important that "γένεσις ἔστιν " . "Becoming exists" is true, and "γένεσις οὐκ ἔστιν ", "Becoming does not exist", or " γένεσις γίγνεται ", "Becoming is becoming" are false. Therefore, it is not the case that Being and Becoming are altogether incompatible, as the choristic dualism insists. Now, what is important here is that Plato himself in a later dialogue shows awareness that this argument is formally valid. Consider this passage from the refutation of extreme Heracliteanism in the Theaetetus (183a4-7; trans. Cornford):

"Now it seems that what has in fact come to light is that, if all things are in change, any answer that can be given to any question is equally right: you may say it is so and it is not so--or 'becomes', if you prefer to avoid any term that would bring these people to a standstill."

In other words, if all things are in flux, if Becoming is absolutely distinguished from Being, then it does not matter which of the three existential alternatives are selected, no one can signify any more than any other. In the Timaeus, Plato, as seen, describes Becoming in these extreme terms, and yet he has to pick one of the alternatives, and stick to it. Even in the postulation of the dualism, on his terms, it is broken down. This difficulty might rightly be termed the paradox of Becoming.

As against this type of suggestion, Cherniss argues (cf.

Cherniss (3), passim; (1), pp. 245-7) that, in the account of the physical universe in the Timaeus, the introduction of the third factor, the Receptacle of all Becoming, makes possible a true theory of Genesis. Here, Plato explains how significant statements can be made, even though the whole of Genesis is in constant and disorderly flux. In the terms of the Theaetetus, Plato might be said to be trying to argue that his absolute Genesis is not the same as the extreme Heraclitean sense of flux, or so Cherniss says ((1), pp.243).

Owen dismisses (cf. Owen (1), pp. 85, note 6) the plea of this passage as 'lame', for he takes it as maintaining that, while we cannot say significantly that anything in Becoming is, we can say significantly what it is like. If Plato were saying this, Owen's dismissal would be justified, but Cherniss clearly demonstrates in the 1954 article that the argument is nothing like so philosophically naive. At this point, however, I want to question whether this more subtle argument does provide us with a true account of Genesis. The argument, as reconstructed by Cherniss, is as follows: the epistemological problems caused by our inability to identify the flux as anything are obviated by a distinction, made within the world of Becoming, between the Receptacle and the εἰκόνες, 'images', of the Forms. The Receptacle is, like the Forms, ἀεί ὄν, φθορὰν δ' οὐ προσδεχόμενον, 'always real, never admitting of destruction' and 'apprehended without the help of the senses by a kind of bastard reasoning' (52a8-b2); the images pass in and out of the Receptacle, in continuous qualitative and existential flux. What is designated, when one applies significant expressions to the world of Becoming, is the Receptacle, it supplies the permanent point of reference for the expression

involved. The description of the Receptacle as having a certain characteristic is occasioned by these images of the Forms, which pass in and out; they are 'distinct and self-identical characteristics' (cf. Cherniss (1), pp. 245; (3), pp.128), but yet are impermanent, affecting only momentarily different parts of the surface of the Receptacle, 'the indeterminate affection' (Cherniss (3), pp. 129).

Let us review the argument up to this point; Plato has to be able to say something about his absolute flux, in order to say it exists, in order to use it in the Theory of Forms; yet, if he distinguishes it absolutely from Reality, this cannot be done. The solution he attempts to find in the Timaeus, by, while on the one hand still asserting that all the images are in constant flux, tying them down momentarily to a Receptacle, which is eternally real. So, by virtue of the perpetual existence of the Receptacle, the world of Becoming can be talked about, but, by virtue of the constant flux of the images, it can be still sharply contrasted with the world of Reality. It should, I think, be clear that, in introducing the Receptacle in this way, Plato has manoeuvred himself into a position not unlike that of Descartes, as outlined in the previous chapter. (pp.12,13) It is fundamental to my argument here that the Receptacle must fit in an ontological category, leaving aside momentarily which one; but I think clearly it must. It fulfils the function of giving to the world of Becoming the status of an object of significant and true discourse, of knowledge, in fact, and this means that it must have some connection with Reality, it must have an ontological status of some sort. If its status is Becoming, then

either Plato has to drop the requirement that nothing in Becoming can have an eternal and unchanging existence, or else he has to drop the eternal existence of the Receptacle; either the dualism is abandoned or the move is a failure. On the other hand, if the Receptacle is real, as its eternal and unchanging existence seem to entail, these being the defining characteristics of Reality, then it cannot be also part of Becoming. Finally, if it has an intermediate type of reality, as certain phrases in the description of it suggest, then we no longer have a dualism.

My case in this chapter, then, is that in the Timaeus the limitations of the choristic dualism are brought into sharp focus. Apart from passages in the critical dialogues where Plato explicitly deals with the Theory of Forms, there are two places where he picks up again the topics of the Timaeus, and goes back on what he has tried there to assert. The first I have already mentioned, namely the critique of the extreme flux-doctrine in the Theaetetus (Thetus 181b-183c). The exposure there of the paradoxes of this doctrine have generally not cost commentators much sleep, because it has been assumed that Plato's own doctrine of Becoming is not open to these criticisms. However, there is evidence* that

*) Aristotle, Metaphysics A 987a32-b7 is the main ancient source for the connexion with Cratylus, and ib. I¹, 1010a10-5 the evidence for the latter's extremism. There is also Plato's dialogue, the Cratylus. Kirk (cf. Bibliography) argues that Plato's representation of Cratylus is incompatible with his being an extreme Heraclitean, and that, of the two thus conflicting testimonies, Plato is to be preferred to Aristotle. Allan (cf. Bibliography) and Cherniss (cf. Cherniss (6)) have shown that this incompatibility is illusory, and that Aristotle's account remains as valid.

it was the extreme version of Heracliteanism that attracted Plato and possibly influenced the introduction of the Theory of transcendent Forms. Further, it has been shown that the doctrine of Becoming is open to these criticisms, and so the critique in the Theaetetus fits well with the pattern of attack on the choristic dualism that I am trying to trace in the critical dialogues. The second theme (that of the status of 'images') is resumed in the Sophist; they are said to be, while not real things, at least real images (240b12-3). This idea is given formal treatment later on (254b-259d) when apart from the utterly unreal, about which nothing can be said, everything else can be described as a function of Being. In general terms, anyway, this seems to be a denial of any ontological dualism; but, since it is explicitly in the context of a discussion of images, and falsehood, the confusion in the Timaeus does not seem to lurk very far away.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMALITIES OF THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT

In 131e-133a of the Parmenides, three objections are brought by Parmenides against the Theory of Forms, as defended by the young Socrates. In this chapter, I shall be discussing the formalities of two of these, the two variations on the theme of the Third Man; I shall not be mentioning the 'Idealist' objection. Against the general background of determining the later development of the Theory of Forms, there has been much discussion in the last decade of the 'Third Man' argument, discussion, some might argue, ad nauseam. Here, I shall be concerned to discuss the two latest contributions to the debate, by Peck and Moravcsik (cf. Bibliography). While they give us insights that no-one else has provided, there is still, I feel, room for critical evaluation of what they say, and I attempt to produce it in the following pages.

There is this large amount of dispute about these arguments, because, in the original, they are stated in a manner essentially informal. The attempts to remove and pin down the formal structure for examination have produced a variety of accounts, all of which are debatably accurate unpackings. I would like to think that it is a virtue of my account to obviate some of these dangerous moves. Even the way in which these arguments are to be rendered in English is not the subject of universal agreement, and often translations have been offered which paved the way neatly for the ensuing interpretation. I shall now give a paraphrase of the two arguments, avoiding as far as possible anything but the least

complicated rendering. The first Third Man Argument (TMA(1)) runs from 131e8-132b2:-

All large particulars seem, when examined, to share a single character; thus Largeness appears a single thing. When Largeness and the large things are looked at, there seems to be another Largeness, by which they all appear large, and behind all of them, another, ad infinitum.

The second argument (TMA(2)) runs from 132c11-133a7:-

Particulars are what they are by being images resembling Forms: therefore Forms will resemble their particulars. Things which are like share the same character, which they only do by being related to a Form. Therefore the Form and resembling particulars will resemble another Form, and all of them another Form, ad infinitum.

My first point is that, although Peck and Moravscik both differentiate between the TMA(1) and the TMA(2), they are wrong in only concentrating on the first of these, and not comparing and contrasting the two. They both wish to call only the first a 'Third Man' argument, even though they both recognise the structural similarity of the two arguments. I hope to show that the second tends to be overlooked, because the formalities of the arguments are insufficiently understood.

Let us now turn to the first argument; Peck's account here is roughly as follows:- No-one, in regard to questions of the validity of the TMA(1), and Plato's awareness thereof, has

taken sufficiently close note of the actual text of the dialogue; hence the confusion over these questions. Peck's thesis is that the TMA(1) is invalid, and known by Plato to be so. He argues on pp. 160 that Plato distinguishes carefully between, τὰ ὁρώμενα, the objects of sight, the qualities in the sensible world, and

τὰ λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενα , the objects of Reason, the qualities in the intelligible world, the Forms. This distinction is vitally important in reconstructing Plato's reply to the TMA(1); the initial premiss, representing the Theory of Forms, should be formulated according to Platonic principles as follows:-

"If there is a K-ness (H) (sc. ὁρώμενον) in each of a number of particulars, a, b, c, there must be a single Form K-ness (L) (sc. λογισμῷ λαμβανόμενον) in virtue of which there is K-ness(H) in each of a, b and c."

Peck is drawing attention to the dilemma which faces the young Socrates here; either the Form and the particular share a common quality, in virtue of which the same predicate can be applied to each, and then the TMA(1) is valid; or they do not, which avoids the TMA(1), but leaves the difficult task of accounting for the influence of the Form over the particulars. This, it must now be noted, is the basis for Aristotle's objection to the Theory of Forms at Metaphysics A, 990b34-991a8; he urges that the predication of the same word of the Form and of the particular must be

either univocal or equivocal, there is no tertium quid; the difficulties are identical.

Peck then analyses in his symbolism the version of this key premiss actually used by Parmenides in the text, and this comes out as follows, (where '(O)' designates some unspecified version of the quality concerned, the above distinction not being made):-

'If there is K-ness (O) in a number of things, a, b and c, there must be a single Form K-ness (O), in virtue of which there is K-ness (O) in each of a, b and c'.

The TMA(1) is manifestly valid against this formulation, and the assumption that the quality is predicated univocally of the Form and particular is as manifest. If this is the formulation that the young Socrates intends, then one does need to search through the Platonic corpus for evidence for the Self-Predication Assumption, the assumption by Plato that there was this univocal predication. This has been done at great length, and with little in the way of conclusive results. Peck, however, denies that this is the correct formulation of Plato's opinion on the matter: the one given a few lines above is Plato's, whereas this one, the bringer of validity, is a dummy set up by Parmenides for his own amusement.

The formulation in terms of K-ness(H) and K-ness(L) provides just that third possibility that Parmenides (and Aristotle, whom we may presume to be using a Parmenidean formulation) will not acknowledge.

In Peck's words,

"This notation will enable us to do justice to Socrates' position, that is, to record both the coincidence and the distinction that he affirms; the coincidence being represented by the symbol K-ness, and the distinction by the bracketed symbols (H) and (L)."

(ib., pp. 165)

If I may expand this in my own words, the argument is that, because the Form and the particulars dependent on it both have the quality of K-ness, there can be that relation of dependence; but, because the Form is K(L), and the particulars K(H), there is a sufficient distinction between them for the TMA(1) to be invalid. That requires for its validity a univocal predication of K-ness, and the predication of K-ness(H) in the one case and K-ness(L) in the other is not a univocal predication; it is not an equivocal one either, so the other prong of the fork is avoided. Peck adds the further comments that (ib., pp. 171-4) no argument over the SPA is relevant here; it is relevant only to Parmenides' attenuated version, which is not Plato's. In the case of Plato's version, the Form of K-ness(L) is tautologously K(L), so, though it is self-predicating, the self-predication is not a problematic one. What would be troublesome is if K-ness(L) were K(H), but that it logically cannot be. What Peck is doing here is fulfilling a brief set out by Vlastos in an earlier discussion of these matters (cf. Vlastos (4), pp. 89-90):-

"Find a sense for F (Peck, I should say, uses 'K' throughout, to distinguish his analysis from Vlastos', who uses 'F') - call it F-a - in which the Form is not F, and present Plato with this sense, telling him that if he will only remember to deny systematically that the Form is F-a, he will not be putting Form and particulars into an ill-formed set, and will have nothing to fear from the TMA. The next step, (for we can't stop here, if we are going to allow Plato to keep assuming that the Form is F nonetheless) is to find him another sense - F-b - in which Form and particulars are F, and go into the same set without any trouble."

The strong point of Peck's case is that we don't need to find this sense for Plato, he has already found it for himself.

I am aware that the question of whether or not Plato realised the validity/invalidity of Parmenides' arguments is a matter of much dispute; it is a dispute in which I would be eager to take sides. But, at this stage in this thesis, I am concerned as far as possible only with the purely formal question of whether or not the arguments are valid. I shall maintain that they are, even though this is rejected by some; I shall produce formal arguments for their validity, ignoring the question of whether this is heresy. In pursuing this matter, I reap advantages from Peck's account of what, according to the middle dialogues, is the correct analysis of the Form/particular relation, for he brings out the underlying formal structure of the arguments, in a way in which it has not been brought out before. This I believe to be the case, even though the conclusions that I wish to draw from Peck's account are not those that he wishes to draw.

I now turn to the second regress argument, TMA(2), at 132c11-133a7, dismissed by both Peck and Moravcsik as negligible, in favour of the first. However, as far as concerns the wider

issue, which ultimately I am debating in this thesis, that of the later development of the Theory of Forms, and the place of the Timeaus therein, it is by far the more important. It concerns the suggested relation of Form to particular as paradigm to copies, a notion which is fundamental to Plato's argument in the Timaeus. Peck (ib., pp. 177-9) argues that it, more obviously even than the TMA(1), depends on Parmenides using the concept of K-ness(0). Moravscik, having distinguished (ib., pp. 51) between the two statements

- (S1) 'A Form has 'F' predicated of it in a sense different from and prior to the sense(s) in which F is predicated of all the entities partaking of the Form',

and

- (S2) 'A Form 'F' has F predicated of it in the same sense in which F is predicated of the particulars',

goes on (pp. 59) to argue that the TMA(2) turns on the symmetrical relationship implied in (S2), which, he maintains, is not Plato's view. Thus, according to both commentators, the TMA(2) is valid only against the thesis that there is a symmetrical relation between Form and particular, and that this symmetricality can only obtain where the predication is univocal. Plato, we remember, is not involved in trouble, because he denies this univocal predication.

This defence has a long and honourable history, and one might christen it the Ontological Defence. Moravscik's version does constitute an interesting variation on the traditional theme, and it merits the separate consideration that I shall give it later

on in this chapter. The idea that the infinite regress is avoided, because of the ontological asymmetry between Form and particular, an idea exactly formalised by Peck's reconstruction, goes right back to the 5th century A.D. commentator, Proclus. In his comment on this argument, (Proclus, 912.27ff) he points out that if indeed the relation involved were purely symmetrical, there would be difficulties, but it is not. Where a Form and a particular are both like, have the quality of likeness, the likeness of that which is derived is not the same as the likeness of that from which it is derived, just because of its derivatory nature. Consequently,

τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ ὁμοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις (τοῖς εἶδεσι), αὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις
'the sensible particulars resemble the Forms, but they are not in οὕτως, ^{οὕτως}
the same relation of resemblance to the particulars' (ib., 913.29-30).

The bare relation of similarity may be symmetrical, but the relation of a similar copy to a similar original is not; the copy is 'a copy of' the original, but the original is not 'a copy of' the copy. In this form, Cherniss (cf. Cherniss (1)) attacks Owen's remark (Owen (1), pp.83) that Plato did not refute Parmenides' argument, because no refutation is possible. Cherniss says,

"The inference that similar things are likenesses of a single original depends for its validity upon the exclusion of the possibility that any of them is itself the original of which the others are likenesses. This careful formulation would have forestalled Parmenides' objection....."

(ib., pp. 253)

He further argues that

"this saving restriction is obliterated by Parmenides in what is in fact the major premiss of his argument, the proposition that any two things which are similar to each other must participate in one and the same thing."

(ib.)

This move, while appearing plausible, is not valid, and it is important that something more be said about its invalidity than has appeared in the literature so far. The move lays heavy, if not sole emphasis on the words 'copy' and 'original' to deny the fatal symmetricality. It is qua copy and qua original, that the copy and the original are connected by the asymmetric relation of 'being a copy of'; it is merely because it is a copy that the copy is a copy of an original, and merely because it is an original that an original has copies made of it. Certainly, there is an asymmetry here, but equally certainly, this is not the aspect of the paradigmatic relations between Forms and particulars that was most important to Plato, in the contexts in which he makes specific use of that relation. According to Ross, (cf. Ross (1), pp. 228-9), apart from casual references at Republic 500e3 and Theaetetus 176e3 (cf. also Politicus 285d-286a; though the casual nature of this is less obvious, it still differs greatly from the Timaeus), the only place where the paradigmatic relation is given any work to do is in the Timaeus. In the account of the creation of the world there given, what is important is not the bare fact that there are Forms and particulars which are copies of them, but that the Forms are Forms of such-and-such, and the particulars such-and-such particulars. It is quite true that the created world is derived from the eternal model by means of a paradigmatic relation, but the whole emphasis of the narrative is on the fact that the eternal model is the eternal model of the world; it is qua eternal model of this type that it plays a vital role in the creation of the world, not merely qua eternal model. Similarly,

the Demiurge is not concerned merely that what he makes is a copy, but that it is a copy of such-and-such a type, namely, of the eternal model of the world. There is certainly an ontological disparity between Forms and particulars, but that alone is an insufficient explanation of the metaphysical function that the Forms perform. If the Forms are to be differentiable from one another, and thus be related to differentiable sets of particulars, they must not only be in some way qualitatively differentiable, but possess some sort of qualitative symmetry as regards the particulars. It is, however, with this necessary qualitative symmetry that Parmenides' arguments are concerned. There is an ontological asymmetry, but that is irrelevant to the point at issue in the TMA(2).

Consider the case of the real live Harold Macmillan, and a photograph of him; one might say that there is an ontological asymmetry between the actual person, and the photo. But if it is a matter of answering the question, How does that photograph come to have the characteristics that it has, it is no use merely replying that it is a photograph of a live original. That does answer the question how it derives its characteristic of being a member of the class of photographs, but is no answer to the question of how it comes to be a photograph of Harold Macmillan. For that question to be answered, the photograph must show an elderly gentleman, wearing a morning suit, an Old Etonian tie and a walrus mustache, and the original subject of the photograph must be wearing these too. Of course, there are still differences; Macmillan's

mustache exists in three-dimensional space, that in the photo does not; Macmillan's Old Etonian tie could be used to support his trousers, that in the photo could not: one can account for these differences in terms of ontological disparity. But still, the mustache must in neither case be like a toothbrush, the tie a puce and vermilion Slim Jim. In case I should be accused of loading this argument by selecting the instance of a photograph and an original, it should be perfectly clear that the same can be said about a painting of Macmillan, even though there are more opportunities for Impressionism there. As far as concerns abstract painting, the precise thing that, for many people, makes it meaningless is that there is little or no direct qualitative symmetry. So then, if asked the bald question, Does the copy resemble the original?, one could answer negatively, if one considered the particular copy and original only as members of their respective wider classes. In a case where what is at stake is, Does this copy resemble this original?, one who answered, 'No, because it's only a copy', would ordinarily be regarded as having misunderstood the point of the question.

With these points before our minds, we should not then find it surprising that in the allegory of the Line in the Republic, Plato defines the relation of particulars to Forms in terms of paintings to actual men and material objects; to forestall any red herrings, let me emphasise that anything other than straight representational art was unknown in Classical Greece. Parmenides is not concerned with general theories, but with how, in particular

cases, the paradigmatic relation works; he is not at all, as Cherniss and Peck imply, demoting the Form to the rank of a particular, in arguing that the Form must in some way bear a qualitative resemblance to its particulars. If the Form Largeness is not in some sense large, how can it be the metaphysical cause of large things, given that this relation of causality is to be analysed as that of copy to original; Parmenides is not suggesting that it has to be a minimum of one cubic parasang in size, but that it has to be Large (L), and not Small(L) or Deciduous(L), if it is to do its job of accounting for large things. Those who reply to Parmenides, as do Cherniss and Peck, the Form of Largeness does not resemble the particular large things, because it is the original and they are copies, are as much missing the point as our imaginary student of English statesmen. Parmenides questions whether the paradigmatic relation works in practice, in particular cases, just as he questions whether participation works in practice, and, in the Mastership objection, whether the Theory of Forms itself works in practice; but more of that in a later chapter. The underlying and mistaken assumption of the Ontological Defence is that the TMA(2) is valid only against a theory where qualities are predicated univocally of Form and particular; since Parmenides assumes his argument is valid, he must be making the Form one particular among others. But Parmenides not only is not doing this, he does not need to do it for his argument to be valid; his argument is valid even against the $K(H)/K(L)$ position, for, as long as K appears in both parts of the equation, there is a resemblance, and the regress gets started. One can legitimately argue, I think, that $K(H)$ and $K(L)$ are not univocal

predicates; they are not equivocal either, which after all is supposed to be the saving grace of this formulation. But the TMA(2) can only be evaded by making the predication equivocal; this is the point that the Ontological Defence overlooks. If the predication is equivocal, then the practical value of the paradigmatic relation is nil.

There have been other attempts at tinkering with the Ontological Defence to come up with a foolproof version; Taylor (cf. Taylor (2)) argues that

"the relation is not mere likeness in some point or other, a symmetrical relation, but the kind of likeness that there is between an original and a copy, likeness plus derivation, and this relation is asymmetrical."

(ib., pp. 287)

This is an improvement on Cherniss, and is close to Peck; it does take account of the fact that the original and the copy must be original and copy of some quality, taking that in a broad sense. But Hardie (cf. Hardie, pp. 93-6) disposed of this view, arguing, as I do, that as long as the relation contains at least a qualitative resemblance, the argument is valid. Owen (ib., pp. 83, note 3) produces a formalisation of Hardie's objection, which does much to bring out its force; he argues that, given that a particular resembles the Form in respect of X, when X is predicated of it, one might say that still X cannot be predicated of the Form; but then this seems to wreck the idea of it being a Form of X, as the copy-original metaphor understands the matter. One might formalise this further, and say:- Given a copy of X and a Form X, there must be some quality Q, in virtue of which the relation of resemblance is

asserted to hold between the particular X and the original Form X; if there is no such Q at all, then there can be no reason for holding that it is of X that both the copy is a copy and the original an original. Naturally, if the Form and particular are X in exactly the same sense, that is covered by this formalisation; but it also covers the case where the quality is the same in each case, and the Form merely has an ontologically superior version of it. This is what, according to the Ontological Defence, is the case in the Theory of Forms, and this is why the Ontological Defence will not work. If the quality is essentially the same, Parmenides' point is well-taken; if it is not even essentially the same, the paradigmatic relation seems valueless.

There are three important ways in which the Forms might be distinguished from their associated particulars, numerically, ontologically and qualitatively; they might be similar in these three ways too. The Forms are certainly numerically distinct and ontologically distinct, but their qualitative similarity or distinctness is another matter. These distinctions are specifically conflated by de Strycker (cf. de Strycker (1)); he argues that the TMA(2) has no force against the Theory of Forms;

"Les objets concrets ressemblent à l'Idée, mais la réciproque n'est pas vraie....elle ne fait pas nombre avec celle-ci (sc. 'sensible world') et ne doit pas réduite à son tour."

He continues by saying that Aristotle (cf. Metaphysics Z.13) only thought the TMA valid, because of a mistaken presupposition that

"l'existence substantielle est toujours celle d'un être particulière; comme substance, l'Idée est donc

\ à ses yeux un objet concret qui se trouve au même niveau d'être que le sensible, et ne contribue donc nullement à l'expliquer."

(pp. 102-3)

de Strycker is right in pointing out that Aristotle has gone wrong in these assumptions, but Parmenides is not Aristotle, neither can one argue that what Aristotle overlooks is thereby correct. de Strycker covers numerical and ontological distinctness, but ignores the matter of qualitative resemblance, and precisely that is the focal point of the TMA.

I conclude my consideration of the Ontological Defence by dealing with another argument by which Cherniss purports to demonstrate the invalidity of Parmenides' position. His case is (pp.254-6) that a premiss of Parmenides' argument entails self-contradictory conclusions, and therefore no argument which employs it is valid. He attempts to prove both that the first Form in the regress must be different from the second, and that it must be identical with it; Parmenides' objection is therefore incoherent. Cherniss' argument in its turn depends on the obliteration of a vital difference, that between two senses of 'character' in the phrase 'share the same character'. There is a sense of 'character', which one would use in stating that everything that is green 'shares the same character'. There is a second sense of 'character', such that definitionally, only my copy of Plato and Parmenides has that character; though other peoples' copies of that book may be coloured exactly the same, they do not have the same character; (x) (if x has that character, then x is my book).

Cherniss outlines the regress in terms of a series of particulars a , b , c , and a series of Forms O , O_2 , O_3 , etc. First he proves that for Parmenides' objection to hold, O_2 and O_3 must be different from one another. If a , b , c , are similar, by being related to O , then a , b , c , and O all share the same character; if a , b , c , and O are all similar by sharing the same character with O_2 , then a , b , c , O , and O_2 all share the same character; this they can only do by sharing a common character with O_3 and so on. If the explanation of the nature of a , b , and c in terms of similarity to O is intended, as Socrates undoubtedly did intend it to be, a final explanation, then we have what is justifiably termed a vicious regress in this explanation. The proof of this regress also certainly needs the non-identity of O_2 and O_3 . None of this I disagree with. But let us consider the other limb of Cherniss' argument, that by which he proves that Parmenides' objection also requires that O_2 and O_3 be identical, thus proving the internal inconsistency of that objection. Parmenides here invokes the principle that any two things similar to each other in a given respect are so similar by participation in one and the same thing. a and O are similar by participating in O_2 ; they are also similar by participating in O_3 ; therefore O_2 and O_3 are identical.

The first thing to notice is the slide from the 'participation by resemblance' idiom to the 'participation' simpliciter idiom; but, while this undoubtedly helps Cherniss' case, it is neither the only nor the chief defect in it. Let us set out his argument in the 'share the same character' idiom; a and O are alike,

because they share the same character with O_2 ; they are also alike, because they share the same character with O_3 . It can only follow from this that therefore O_2 and O_3 are identical, if 'character' is being used in the second of the two senses that I outlined above. If one remains with the first sense, then there is no problem at all of this type in a, O , O_2 and O_3 sharing the same character, in fact, on the terms of the enquiry, they must do so. In the other sense, nothing can ever share the same character with anything, and the result is either extreme Heracliteanism, or extreme Parmenidean monism, neither of which Plato ever entertained as universally valid. Socrates would certainly deny that the Form and its particulars shared the same character in the second sense, and would deny that they shared the same character, in a third sense of that word, such that all copies of Plato and Parmenides share the same character, but all green books do not. But he would want to assert that they share the same character in the first sense, and he does assert it. Further, I find nothing in the text to suggest it is in anything but the first sense that Parmenides is implying that the Form and its particulars share a character. The point I want to make above all is that the TMA(2) is valid even against a theory using this sense of 'character'.

That Parmenides is concerned with what it is to share a common character in this sense comes out very clearly from Peck's analysis of the formal structure of the dispute. But what Peck calls the ignoring of a vital distinction by Parmenides, I should rather call justified concentration on the similarity that remains,

after the distinction has been made. Whatever distinctions there are as well, there must be some resemblance, and it is the resemblance, not the difference, that the Copy-Resemblance interpretation of participation emphasizes and employs.

I turn now to Moravscik's discussion of the Third Man Arguments. We have already seen that he makes (ib., pp. 51) a distinction between two different versions of self-predication, a version he rightly calls absurd, and a version where the predicate is attached 'in a sense different from and prior to' the ordinary sense, when it is attached to the Form. Here we have no talk of ontological disparity, but what would be better called 'logical disparity'. One may presume that this represents a worthy attempt by Moravscik to unpack the ontological issue into contemporary analytic terminology. He goes on to explain that this latter version, (S1) of his pair, (vid. pp. 39 above), involves 'focal meaning' (pp. 59, note 1); the reference is to Owen's explication of the term in Owen (3), the notion, found in parts of Aristotle, of predicates which are $\pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma \ \acute{\epsilon}\nu \ \lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ 'pros hen legomena'. This notion is as follows; as we have seen, in his criticism of the Theory of Forms, Aristotle assumes the simple dichotomy, that terms must be predicated either $\delta\rho\omega\nu\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omega\varsigma$ or $\sigma\upsilon\nu\omega\nu\acute{\upsilon}\mu\omega\varsigma$ 'equivocally' or 'univocally'; there is no third possibility. The notion of 'focal meaning', on the other hand, is just this third possibility, which, argues Owen, Aristotle makes use of, when he later becomes interested in the examination of $\tau\acute{o} \ \acute{o}\nu \ \tilde{\eta} \ \acute{o}\nu$, 'being qua being', as for example in Metaphysics Γ. When F is

predicated in this way of the Form and particular, the predication is neither simply univocal, nor univocal plus a difference in ontological status, but something more than this. The predicates have all the same focus, the same orientation, but are not identical. Aristotle seems to be toying with something like Wittgenstein's notion of Family Resemblances. In developing this idea, Wittgenstein rejects the simple dichotomy of Nominalism versus Realism, either instances of the same universal possess a common property, to justify the use of the general word, or they do not, and there is no justification. Instead, he suggests that, on examination of an ordinary universal, 'games' he cites as a case in point, 'If you look at them, you will not see something common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that'. (Wittgenstein (1), §66 - for a fuller account, cf. ib. §§37-77, Wittgenstein (2), pp. 17-9, Bambrough (2), passim.)

This notion of 'focal meaning' Moravscik suggests (pp.59) is likely to have been Plato's view of the matter, a suggestion that I shall evaluate shortly. He also implies that, other things being equal, 'focal meaning' would provide Plato with an adequate defence against the TMA(1); its usefulness against the TMA(2) should by now be evident. Moravscik (pp. 59 still) remarks that (S1) avoids all the difficulties of (S2), the simple univocal account; against it, the regress argument TMA(2) has no validity. He has other reasons for wanting to assert the validity of TMA(1), and these I shall discuss in the last paragraphs of this chapter; my immediate concern is to dispute the suggestion that 'focal meaning' enables the Theory of Forms to evade any regress argument

based on the fact that Form and particulars are both in this way F.

The weight of any argument to the effect that 'focal meaning' is an adequate defence must be borne by the following proposition (P):- If it is not the case that there is one single identifiable property, identical in each case, in virtue of which the relation of resemblance holds between a Form F and particular Fs, then the relation of resembling copy to resembling paradigm is not symmetrical. It is clear that both Peck's and Moravscik's account presuppose (P), even though they differ in the ways they proceed from this presupposition. 'Focal meaning', for Moravscik, represents the antecedent of (P), and therefore he feels justified in asserting the consequent. I do not deny that 'focal meaning' represents the antecedent, but I do deny that (P) is true. Moravscik, as others before him, has been misled into emphasising only one aspect of the relation that he is considering. Part of saying that the predicate F as attached to the Form, and the predicate F as attached to particulars are pros hen legomena is certainly to deny that the predication is univocal. But this is only part of what is said; the other part of what is said is that the predication is not equivocal either. The doctrine of 'focal meaning' asserts that two things, even though they do not have F predicated of them univocally, are still both rightly called F, are F. In other words, we still have a relation of resemblance obtaining; we still have an aspect of Form and particular, which is objectively identifiable as that aspect of their nature, in virtue of which the

same predicate can be attached to them; in spite, it is true, of the differences between the F-ness of the Form and the F-ness of the particulars.

Let me put this point, by comparing Peck's and my formalisations. Peck argues that the Form and the particular both have K-ness; I argued that, as this stands, it does not evade the regress. The quality Q, in virtue of which the relation holds, is that of having K-ness, even though a differentiation on ontological grounds may be made. How does the shift to 'focal meaning' affect my analysis? All it amounts to is that the value to be substituted for Q in the formula is not now one single, simple property, but something more complex. Q does not now name a single property, as in a univocal predication, but names something like Wittgenstein's 'network of similarities criss-crossing and overlapping' (cf. (1) §66). But this network, this complex is still something shared by Form and particular; if either did not possess part of this complex, it would not possess F-ness, it would not be F. The difference between the Theory of Forms with 'focal meaning' and the Theory of Forms without is only the difference between two varying substitutions for Q. The formula, that there must be a Q shared by both Form and particular is still correct, and that, as stated, is quite sufficient to entail the infinite regress.

If my argument here is correct, the question of whether or not either TMA is valid against the Theory of Forms is not affected by the matter of whether or not Plato did believe that predicates as applied to Forms and particulars were pros hen legomena,

or simply univocally, or univocally plus an ontological difference, or what. I assume that Peck's formulation is other than a 'focal meaning' formulation; the latter, as Moravscik understands it, involves 'a sense different from and prior to' for the Form; Peck demands only 'prior to'. Having stated that I think Peck's account is likely to have been Plato's, I ought to comment on Moravscik's suggestion to the contrary. Firstly, to get the Plato of the middle dialogues out of the reach of Aristotle's fork, as it might be termed, one does not have to resort to 'focal meaning'; what Peck offers is quite enough. Moravscik assumes that what is involved must be either simple univocal predication, or one involving 'focal meaning'; the former is certainly absurd, but the latter is not the only alternative. His second point, also on pp. 59, is that the TMA(2) depends for its validity on simple univocal predication; Plato would never have used two arguments based on the same faulty premiss, therefore the TMA(1) involves something else. I have argued that both TMAs are valid against any sort of predication which involves saying the Form and particulars are both in some sense F, therefore this point is not correct; anyway, Moravscik once again assumes 'focal meaning' as the only viable alternative. Peck's formulation also allows for criteria for identifying and individuating Forms, a necessary requirement that, for Moravscik, is only filled by 'focal meaning'. As far as concerns direct rather than circumstantial evidence that Plato in the middle dialogues used the notion of 'focal meaning', Moravscik has very little. He remarks that all the passages involving self-predication are compatible with either of the formulations he

offers (pp.58), which is not much help. On pp. 52, he cites Sophist 256a11-12, as one among other examples in the later dialogues showing Plato was aware of ambiguity. That passage does indeed involve the recognition and employment of the notion of conceptual ambiguity, but it is significant that these examples are in the later dialogues. As such, they cannot be direct evidence for the notion that 'focal meaning' played a part in the Theory of Forms of the middle dialogues. Sprague (cf. Bibliography) produces a strong case for equivocation being deliberately employed in the Hippias Major and Euthydemus, both probably early dialogues. But the main point is deeper than this; why should Plato's awareness of ambiguity be any proof of his awareness of 'focal meaning' since that is radically different from ambiguity; it is in fact from ambiguity that it requires most carefully to be distinguished. Moravcsik argues (pp. 52), Plato is aware of ambiguity, therefore he is aware of the notion of difference of sense, a notion which is involved in 'focal meaning'; however, a very few lines earlier, he takes great pains to distinguish 'difference of sense', as involved in 'focal meaning', from 'difference of meaning', as involved in ambiguity. I cannot but conclude he overreaches himself here. Owen, from whom he derives inspiration, states, both in the paper already referred to (cf. Owen (3), pp. 181-190, especially 186-7) and elsewhere (cf. Owen (2), pp. 104-5), that at the most Plato thought of relative terms only as pros hen legomena, when predicated of Forms and particulars. Owen also (Owen (3), pp. 189) remarks that even Aristotle never fully understood 'focal meaning', and he is notoriously a more sophisticated logician than the Plato

of the middle dialogues, at any rate. Peck's formulation is not tremendously sophisticated, and is rather more the move that would first strike one, when faced with Aristotle's fork and its problems. (I do not wish to say that, when he was writing the middle dialogues, Plato faced it wielded by Aristotle). In addition, Peck is able to cite appropriate evidence for his position (cf. *ib.*, pp. 160).

There remains one further matter to be dealt with in this chapter, and that is Moravscik's interpretation of why the TMA(1) is invalid. I have been talking about the possession of qualities by Form and particular, and the validity of both TMAs, even though it is apparently only the second that specifically talks about regresses being caused on these terms. The TMA(1) talks about how we apprehend Forms and particulars as being F, a matter of ways and means of cognition, not qualities of that which is the object of the cognitive act. It is by emphasising this that Peck and Moravscik are able to distinguish heavily between the TMA(1) and the TMA(2). I have stated (pp. 35) that I believe it is mistaken to draw too heavy a line here, and that this has confused the issue concerning the formal structure and validity of the TMA(1). I want to argue that as a matter of fact the TMA(1) and (2) are not separate arguments, but two aspects of one and the same argument, two ways of looking at one and the same problem. The TMA(1) is concerned with how we apprehend particular and Form, the TMA(2) with how the particulars come to have their respective characteristics; one apparently an epistemological

question, the other a metaphysical one. But the point to be underlined is that the issue in the TMA(1) is not epistemological, in the sense of that word in which the philosophy of perception is called epistemology. The question is not simply, How do we know particulars exist?, How do we perceive their physical characteristics? It is rather a matter of how ultimately we know them to be F, what justification there ultimately is for calling them F. These matters are not separable from questions of how we know them to be F, when the issues are taken as falling within the scope of the Theory of Forms. For that is a metaphysical, not a physical theory, and metaphysical questions as to how we know things are F are the same as metaphysical questions about how things are F.

For this reason, Moravscik's account of the TMA(1), although having the merit of originality, misses the real point of the argument. He is perfectly aware that 'the manner of apprehension.....has nothing to do with content' (pp.57); but he is mistaken in thinking that the TMA(1) is solely concerned with the manner of apprehension. He constructs the TMA(1), to produce a regress, on the basis of its being concerned with the manner of apprehension. But the concern of the TMA(1) is not merely with the manner of apprehension, but with what ultimately it is to apprehend a particular as being of such-and-such a type. Peck is at fault here in a different way; he realises the point I have just made, but does not appreciate the resultant parallelism of the two TMAs.

I have not in this chapter touched upon the wider issues involved here, whether Plato knew the TMAs to be valid, what effect this knowledge might have had on the development of the Theory of Forms; these will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. I have been trying to bring some further light to bear on the formal structure of these arguments, and to consider whether certain defences against them are valid. I have taken Peck as rightly explaining the mechanics of predication in the Theory of Forms; this has two consequences, firstly, that the simple version of self-predication, and the dispute over whether Plato believed in it, are ruled out of order; secondly, that some more sophisticated terminology such as 'focal meaning' is not needed. I then argued that the Form and its particulars must share a common property in some sense, for the Theory of Forms to stand a chance of being correct, but that, whatever the sense, an infinite regress of explicanda is set up. This is the only point that I shall make specific use of in what follows; however, it is fundamental to my thesis, and I have therefore been forced to attempt at some length to establish it.

CHAPTER V

PARMENIDES AND THE TWO WORLDS ARGUMENT

We have now seen that Plato finds himself involved in difficulties and contradictions in the Timaeus in trying to push through his dualism. This makes it feasible to suggest that, if it were the case that the discussion between Parmenides and Socrates in the Parmenides were devoted to exposing those difficulties in rather more formal terms, then the most likely ordering of the two dialogues is that the Timaeus should precede the Parmenides, and probably be fairly close to it in time. I now propose to show that the discussion I have been examining in the previous chapter of this thesis does constitute such an exposure. We remember that Plato's dualism, in one very important aspect, at least, is designed to help us solve certain epistemological puzzles, to give the means whereby we can have knowledge, when knowledge cannot exist through the media ordinarily used. If it can be shown that it fails in this purpose, because of the inherent defects in it qua choristic dualism, then, because Plato was a philosopher, it is possible that he was aware of this failure, and possible that precisely that is the reason why he abandoned it. I now set myself to showing these possibilities are actualities.

Firstly, we must consider how it is that Plato's dualism does, in this fashion, fail to solve these epistemological puzzles. Let us take what might be described as a soul's-eye-view of the proceedings; Cornford is certainly right in saying that it would be a mistake to assume that, if there is a sharp divide between the

world of Reality and the world of Appearance, 'we' are on the hither side, (cf. Cornford (1), pp.99), for it is part of the Theory of Forms to argue that our soul enables us to have knowledge of both realms. Let us, then, take the case of a man, who is in a position to know that the animal before him is a horse; the question is, How is he enabled to arrive in this position? Firstly, as a result of a suitable process of (probably, in this case, informal) learning, he arrives at right belief about the nature of horses; he is able, on inspecting certain beasts, to identify them correctly as being horses. Since, however, this is only right belief, the ability is likely at any moment to vanish; it stands in need of confirmation, before he can be said to know the nature of horses.* This confirmation is obtained after a further period of training, during which time the individual comes to apprehend an eternal Form of Horse in a transcendent and truly real world, to grasp the true nature of that by seeing it related to the Form of Good, and see the relations between the Form of Horse and the particular horses. Having seen the true nature of horses, he can never more fail to recognise particular horses, when they are presented to him.

It seems to be an essential element in this account that

*) Certain aspects of this process, such as this distinction between the impermanence of right belief and the permanence of knowledge, come out better in the case of, e.g., particular instances of justice; it stretches the imagination to postulate that one's right belief about horses waxes and wanes, as might one's right belief about justice. However, the notion of identifying a particular because of its objective characteristics seems more at home in an equine context, and my concern is rather more with that.

the soul is able to correlate visually the two different sets of objects that it has commerce with as a cognitive agent. (I should make it clear that these phrases are intended to be no more or no less literally interpreted, than the vocabulary of visual perception usually is in philosophical contexts.) Starting from that point of reference, one can offer the following exclusive alternatives: Either (A) there is some objective quality involved in the judging, or (B) there is not. In terms of the formalisation that I gave earlier, (pp.45-6) either Q has a value, or it does not. This phrase 'objective quality' is deliberately vague, because I showed in cap.IV that there are various possible kinds of value for Q, and I wish to avoid the tedium of working this present analysis out for each of them in turn. If (B) is the case, then there can be no reason for the soul to correlate what it sees with its metaphysical eyes with what it sees with its physical eyes; this makes it difficult to see how the world of Forms, and the theory which postulates it, have any functional value. However, I mention that alternative only for formal completeness, for, as we have seen in cap.IV, there is general agreement that, for Plato, Q does have a value, even though there is dispute over which kind of value he thought it to be. What follows if alternative (A) is unpacked? Using Peck's symbolism, our horsey type, let us call him Philippus, has a consistent but theoretically shakable ability to identify horses (H), is led to see and recognise Horse (L), and then really knows he was right about horses (H) and will never be wrong again.

The first difficulty in this account is this, How does Philippus' vision of Horse(L) in any way usefully add to the identifying ability that he already has. He is able to identify correctly a wide range of horses(H), for otherwise he would not be on the threshold of the world of Forms; he has this ability, because he has right belief about Qs. Yet all he sees when he sees Horse(L) is another Q, resembling the Qs he is already aware of. What he has, after seeing the Forms, is nothing more than he has already, namely, a range of Qs at his disposal. There may be psychological reasons why he comes away and back into the cave a better man, but there are no logical reasons. If one argues that the ontological superiority of Horse(L) makes the difference, this can only be a psychological difference; it has a Q like any other, and so logically no advantage is gained. This situation reminds one of Wittgenstein's tale, cautionary in another context, of the man who bought several copies of the morning newspaper, to assure himself that what it said was true. (cf. Wittgenstein (1), §§265)

It might be argued at this point that I am being unfair to Plato, that the situation could be described in terms which would mean there was a positive advantage in terms of knowledge to be gained from seeing the Forms. It would be something like this:- The man with right belief recognises that mail-boxes, poppies, tomatoes, maple leaves on flags, Welsh rugger jerseys and so on are all the same colour; he is even able consistently to put some things in this group and reject others. He believes that they are called 'red', because of being this particular colour, but he does not know. Then he is shown a colour-chart, with this colour on it,

and the word 'RED' underneath; so now he knows that these things are red, his right belief is confirmed in its rectitude. This is in fact an idea put forward by Wittgenstein (cf. Geach, pp.74), the idea that the Forms are to be interpreted as Standard examples, such as the Standard Metre or the Standard Pound. But this example merely serves to bring out the point that I made at the end of the previous paragraph, that this confirmation by reference to the Form is a purely psychological process. The person concerned has no more or no less knowledge of the logical character of 'red' than he had before, particularly so in the case of 'metre'. The 'ontological superiority' is well represented by the label saying 'RED' or the placard saying 'STANDARD METRE', but squares marked 'red' on a colour-chart are red, the Standard Metre is one metre long. If it were measured, and found to be 95 centimetres only, we would talk about Time's ceaseless erosion, and not about the inaccuracy of our previous beliefs about metres. Philippus does not have any logical reasons that he did not have before, and it is as supplying some necessary addition to our knowledge that the Theory of Forms is presented.

But this is only one of a complementary pair of difficulties, where this analysis of knowledge is concerned. It is the other that is more important for this present context, since it exposes an infinite regress in the Theory of Forms. We now grant to Plato that there is some inadequacy in Philippus' state of mind as regards horses(H), which needs to be removed. He needs to remove it by seeing that these horses(H) are all similar to something

else, a Horse(L). But this Horse(L) has Q like all the other horses, even though it is Q(L). So if appreciating Q in the one case is not enough, but has to be supplemented by that Q being checked against another one, then, by parity of reasoning, that Q has to be checked against another, and that against another. Of course, one might dispute that this regress need be infinite, that, once one has got back as far as a paradigm case, then there is no regress. But what makes paradigm cases paradigm cases is not their possession of logical characteristics which no other cases possess, but their possession of something comforting like ecclesiastical or legal authority. The Forms are presented as giving ultimate grounds for knowledge, but, the way the Theory is set out, the presentation is unsuccessful.

This extended discussion has been designed to show how the Theory of Forms, possessing as it does the characteristic features of a choristic dualism, the two absolutely separate worlds and the bridge-entity between them, is open to the unanswerable TWAs. If the existence of the bridge-entity is denied, then the two difficulties that I have just been discussing are avoided, but then the world of Forms remains a vain speculation. If, to avoid this, the soul is allowed to see what is going on in both worlds, we have the original problem reduplicated ad infinitum, or else reasons for denying that the original problem existed. Any of these possibilities, if actualised, render the Theory of Forms inadequate as an account of the ultimate source of knowledge.

I am maintaining in this thesis that Plato came to have some awareness of these difficulties, and that for that reason he abandoned his choristic dualism. My task, in the remainder of this and the next chapter, is to produce from the critical dialogues some passages to support this contention. I shall be concerned with analysing the first part of the Parmenides, and the discussion between the Eleatic Stranger, the Materialists, and the Friends of the Forms in the Sophist. Fundamental to my remarks henceforth are the points which I take to have been heretofore established, namely that the TMA is valid against the Theory of Forms, because the theory does entail the infinite regress, as Parmenides suggests; and that this is so, because the talk of 'paradigmatism' entails some qualitative resemblance between Form and particular, and this is sufficient to start the infinite regress.

Socrates, at Parmenides 128e5ff., offers the Theory of Forms as dissolving Zenonian paradoxes about the one and the many. The first point to make is that the theory Socrates is defending is the Theory of Forms of the middle dialogues; in particular, the Forms are described at 129d7-8 as χωρὶς αὐτὰ καθ'αὐτά, the characteristic of the Forms that I am concentrating on in this thesis. Then at 130b1-5, the Forms and the particulars, and in addition the quality that the particulars have are all distinguished. The problem of the extent of the world of Forms is irrelevant to the issues of this thesis, and the succeeding objections to participation also. The important passages are those dealing with the TMAs and the 'Mastership' objection; I shall now proceed

to deal with each of these in turn.

(I) The two TMAs are best considered in this context as forming a complementary pair; if we assume that, we shall be better able to take account of a disagreement between Peck and Vlastos over the interpretation of the arguments. As it reads, the TMA(1) corresponds fairly closely to my analysis of the TWA in the immediately preceding pages. Cornford (cf. Cornford (1)) translates the passage as follows:-

"I imagine that your ground for believing in a single Form in each case is this; when it seems to you that a number of things are large, there seems to be a single character which is the same when you look at them all; hence you think that Largeness is a single thing.....But now take Largeness itself and the other things which are large. Suppose you look at all of these in the same way in your mind's eye, will not yet another unity make its appearance--a Largeness by virtue of which they all appear large?.....If so, a second Form of Largeness will present itself, over and above Largeness itself and the things that share in it; and again, covering all of these, yet another, which will make all of them large. So each of your Forms will be no longer one, but an indefinite number."

This argument of Parmenides' obviously depends on the assumption that 'large' can be predicated in some sense of both the Form and the particular. Peck, (ib., pp. 164) notes that Vlastos (cf. Vlastos (2), pp. 320) is at fault in his transcription of the first step in this argument, for he mistakenly implies that we need to see the Form of X, before we can recognise a particular as being X. On the other hand,

"It is precisely because we discern that there is X in particulars that we are led to become aware of the Form X, and so to discern it, or, as Plato would say, 'recall' it, and to realise that particulars are what they are in virtue of it."

(ib.: Peck's italics)

Strictly speaking, it might appear that Peck is shifting his ground here, for Parmenides appears to be talking about how we come to know particulars to be what they are, and Peck is talking about how they come to be what they are. If one takes seriously the following contemporary critical discussion of a realist theory of universals, such as Plato's, then there seems to be some confusion. D.F. Pears writes thus:-

"'Because universals exist' is the answer to at least two general questions: 'Why are things what they are?' and 'Why are we able to name things as we do?'....They can be clearly distinguished, the first requiring a dynamic answer from scientists, and the second a static answer from logicians.....When detailed causal answers were provided (to the first of these questions), the comprehensive answer 'Because universals exist' was no longer acceptable or necessary. (Socrates in the Phaedo 100d says that it is the only acceptable answer to the first question. But the advance of science has undermined this thesis more thoroughly than the advance of logic has undermined the thesis that it is an acceptable answer to the second question.)....For, though comprehensive answers to the first question are clearly futile, there are no obvious penalties attached to answering the second question in a comprehensive way."

(Pears, pp. 52)

If one now proceeds to take a look at the TMA(2), there are problems indeed, for there Socrates offers a suggestion as to how the particulars come to be what they are:-

"These Forms are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses; and this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing but their being made in their image."

(Cornford (1), pp. 93)

Thus it seems that Socrates himself is offering a realist account of universals as an answer to both these questions, and Parmenides

is considering it as an inadequate answer to them. Peck, on the other hand, formulates the TMA(1) so as to make it concerned with the same as the TMA(2), 'How are things what they are?', and sees no wrong in this.

What is happening is that Pears is oversimplifying the situation. He is perfectly right in warning us against the 'super-scientist' conception of the philosopher, especially in the context of a discussion of ancient thought; for the confusion of physics and metaphysics, if one may so put it, is literally as old as the history of philosophy. But the Pre-Socratics can be excused, because of their conceptual inability to think in abstract terms. What Pears says in that quotation is the perfect answer to the old chestnut of "Thales--Philosopher or Scientist?". But, in thinking that the question 'Why are things what they are?' necessarily is a question demanding a detailed scientific answer, Pears is misleading us. That question is capable of being a metaphysical one; the ultimate answer to it can be given on the grand scale, if that is one's taste in these matters. The ultimate question 'Why is that a horse?' does not permit an answer in terms of stud books and manuals of animal reproduction. In that it is a metaphysical question, then it is the same question as 'Why are we able to name things as we do?' What dictates whether a scientific or a metaphysical answer is appropriate is the circumstance of the question's being asked: in the context of the Theory of Forms, it must be metaphysical. Pears is wrong in suggesting that Plato was confused over this point; in the long passage of the Phaedo from which he

quotes, Socrates distinguishes, not two rivals for the title of scientific cause, but two different types of cause altogether; the Sun allegory is unintelligible, except on the hypothesis that the entities concerned are analogues, not opponents.

When this is realised, then what is going on in the two TMAs should be very much clearer, for the two of them together, seen as a complementary pair, bring out the closeness of Parmenides' argument to the TWA that I have been describing. Of the 'reduplication or dissolution' alternatives, Parmenides is concerned solely with the former. In the TMA(1), he brings out that the problem of naming is infinitely reduplicated, in Socrates' account of the matter: in the TMA(2), he brings out that it is the problem of how ultimately things are what they are that is reduplicated. If a horse(H), possessing some Q, is what it is because it reflects a Horse(L) possessing that same Q, then that Horse(L) is what it is by reflecting another Horse(L) with its Q, and so on. Once the choristic dualism is broken up, by the institution of relations between the two worlds, it becomes useless. This is so, and the force of Parmenides' arguments is to indicate as much.

(II) We turn now to the so-called 'Mastership' objection, the general tenor of which is to suggest that the Forms might become unknowable. Peck dismisses this argument,

"I need say no more about it, except to say that it consists wholly of bluster."

(ib. pp. 179)

Most scholars fall in behind Cornford (cf. Cornford (1), pp. 98-9)

in dismissing the argument as invalid, on the grounds that it involves confusing the perfect instance of X with the Form of X. Parmenides argues that in general, where there are different sets of particulars, each set called by the same name, and different Forms corresponding to these, the Forms can only have relations among themselves, and the particulars among themselves. For example, particular masters enslave particular slaves, but not Slavery itself; that can only be in slavery to Mastership itself. A slave in this world is a slave with respect to a master in this world, not with respect to Mastership itself. Therefore, Socrates must be wrong in asserting that a particular in this world is what it is with respect to something in the real world of the Forms. This argument is supposedly invalid, on the grounds that only perfect instances of Mastership and Slavery can be involved in relations in this way. We cannot, it is true, be Masters of Slavery; but this does not mean we cannot partake in the Forms, that we cannot be masters by partaking in the Form Mastership.

I shall comment shortly on whether I think this objection to Parmenides' argument holds, but it is worthwhile first to point out that it is possible for Parmenides' conclusion to be valid, even if, for some reason or other, he employs a partially inadequate piece of argumentation to bring this out.* This would only entail the falsity of that conclusion, if it were the case that the above were the only possible piece of argumentation that Parmenides could use to bring out his point, and I am sure that no one would

*) Passmore (ib., pp. 40) refers to it as 'somewhat obscure and unsatisfactory', but as 'foreshadowing' the orthodox TWA.

want to maintain that. It is interesting to note that Runciman uses this very form of argument to infer the falsity of the Master-ship objection:-

"It is of course true that Mastership is not the master of a slave in the way in which a particular master is. But this does not establish that there cannot be any connexion between a master and Mastership.....One of the reasons which make this (Parmenides') argument invalid is that, in order to prove his contention, Parmenides would have to exhaust all possible varieties of relation."

(Runciman (1), pp. 98)

There are two things that I want to say here. The first is very brief, and arises out of these remarks of Runciman's. One may certainly react as Runciman does, but the burden of proof is on the supporter of the Theory of Forms, to say what, if not that, the relationship involved precisely is. This is a case analogous with that of the objections against participation, with which Parmenides commences his attack; certainly, he interprets participation in a 'grossly material manner' (cf. Cornford (1), pp. 85); but this leaves the residual problem of explaining how the relation is to be interpreted, if not literally. It is not enough merely to say in our present context, But that is not what is meant by saying individual masters and slaves are related to Mastership and Slavery.

More importantly, consider the following quotation from an earlier work than Cornford's:-

"The gravest difficulty has yet to be faced. It is that the recognition of the two worlds presupposed by Socrates.....leads to direct scepticism..... In a word, the consequence of a theory of two distinct 'worlds' or 'orders' will be that every relation falls wholly within one of the two; there can be no relation connecting a member of one with a member of the other."

(Taylor (3), pp. 358-9)

The first thing to notice is the way in which Taylor unpacks this objection, for he has put his finger exactly on the difficulties in the Theory of Forms. The second thing to notice is that he does not make the point that everyone else makes about the invalidity of this argument. He simply ignores the matter, and remarks

"If Socrates has been badly perplexed by the discussion that has just closed, it is because, in his zeal, he has attempted to enunciate his doctrine about Forms without a sufficient preparatory discipline in arid and apparently 'useless' formal logic."

(ib. pp. 359)

and from that point leads into the second part of the dialogue. This suggests either that he does not think that the argument is invalid in the traditional fashion, or else that he does not think that that is the main point of it. However these possibilities in Taylorian interpretation are resolved, I do not think that that is the main point of it, and I do think that the main point of the Mastership objection is to bring out exactly the lesson that Taylor brings out in the first quotation from him. It is interesting to note that, under the rubric of disposing of the Theory of Forms without reference to the TMA, R.J. Butler produces an argument very like the Mastership objection. (cf. Bibliography) Plato seems less of a fool than one might think.

The concentration on the remarks about slaves and Slavery, masters and Mastership, obscures the fact that this is only one of the barrels in the twin-barrelled gun that Parmenides here is using. At 134a3ff., he fires the second, that, given Knowledge of Reality and knowledge of reality, there can be no connexion between

these two levels. All we can have is knowledge, so we cannot know Reality, because Reality can only be Known. This also makes it irrelevant to argue that only perfect instances, not forms, can be the subject of these relations. So long as there are two worlds, two sets of relations, two sets of entities as terms in those relations, Parmenides has made his point. Further, the fact that Plato permits what, in the preceding dialogues, would be a misuse of language, suggests not so much the setting-up of a hypothesis known to be fallacious, as a change in attitude towards the theory which necessitated the use of that technical terminology. This is further evidenced by the serious enquiry into the possibilities of sense-perception as knowledge in the Theaetetus, even though that enquiry is inconclusive.

If we compare the Knowledge and Reality objection with the analysis that I gave at the beginning of this whole part, especially as regards the question of the necessary absolute division of the two worlds, and the equally necessary consequence that this makes them unable to perform the task for which they were evolved, I think it becomes clear that there are very strong reasons for suggesting once again that Plato is thinking down the same sort of lines. This becomes even more obvious, when one takes a note of what Cornford says by way of concluding his analysis of the Master-ship objection, part of which I have already quoted:-

"Another weak point is the assumption that, if there is a sharp line between the two worlds, 'we' are confined to the hither side of it. Our bodies certainly are; but, as the Phaedo argued, our souls are more akin to the unseen and the intelligible.....Thus souls are an intermediate order of existence, having a foot in both

worlds, and capable of knowing both.....The doctrine expressly contradicts Parmenides' suggestion that the separation of the Forms cuts them off from our knowledge."

(ib., pp. 99)

What Cornford is dealing with here is the problem of interaction which I mentioned in my initial discussion of the choristic dualism and TWAs. (pp. 9-11) The emphasis on the separateness of the Forms produces just this problem, although it is perfectly true to say that in the Phaedo era Plato does not consciously see it, and introduce the soul to solve it; he presents the theory, we see these features, on analysing it. The existence of the soul as bridge-entity points to the problem that Plato has here; there must be some connexion between the two worlds, else the choristic dualism is fruitless. Given that there are two distinct parts to the soul, each of which is akin to the objects that it cognizes, the separateness and the lack of relations remain. On the other hand, if the soul is allowed to break up the dualism, the benefits of separation are gone, and impassable obstacles are reached. All these points are to be found, I suggest, in Parmenides' criticism of Socrates' theory, which argues that the criticism is deliberate.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEFINITION OF REALITY

Sophist 246e-249d consists of an imaginary tripartite discussion between the Eleatic Stranger, the Materialists and the Idealists. It is part of an attempt to 'study reality and find out what those who use the word think it stands for' (Soph 243d3-5; all further references in this chapter to the Sophist, unless otherwise indicated). Both these groups of philosophers are criticised for offering too narrow a conception of Reality; it is not perhaps surprising that in a Platonic dialogue, a Materialist conception of Reality should be attacked as inadequate, but that an Idealist conception should also be criticised is somewhat unexpected. I shall follow the argument of the passage through, and then offer an interpretation of it.

The Materialists define Reality as the same thing as body; only that which can be handled and touched is real (245a7-b3). However, they will generally also admit to the reality of justice, wisdom and other abstract moral qualities, yet these do not have bodily extension; therefore, their definition is not wide enough. The Stranger then offers one of his own for their acceptance, to include all the things they want to say are real without any bother. This 'mark of reality' is as follows, 'a potentiality to affect or be affected in the slightest degree by the most insignificant agent' (247e1-2). Now the Stranger turns to the 'Friends of the Forms', as the Idealists are dubbed. Their theory is described in familiar

terms, for they postulate an absolute χωρισμός , 'division', between γένεσις 'Becoming' and οὐσία 'Being', the former known only through the body by means of the senses, the latter through the soul by means of reasoning; the former changeable, the latter changeless. The Stranger points out that this notion is not compatible with the definition of reality that has just been offered, for the following reasons. Knowing is a ποίημα, an affecting, and being known a πάθημα, a being affected; if reality is changeless, then it cannot be known, for to be known is to be changed (248d10-e4). "But", says the Stranger, "are we really to be so easily convinced that change, life, soul, understanding have no place in that which is perfectly real--that it has neither life nor thought, but stands immutable in solemn aloofness, devoid of intelligence?" "That", replies Theaetetus, "would be a strange doctrine to accept." The resultant hypothesis is that τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὥς ὄντα, 'we must admit that what changes and change itself are real things'. (249b2-3) The final conclusions are that, if the whole of Reality is changeless, there will be no intelligence anywhere, and equally so, if the whole of Reality is changing; therefore Reality in toto must be the sum of all things unchangeable and changing (249d3-4).

What are we to make of these remarks and conclusions?

The notion that Reality cannot consist wholly of changing things is orthodox Platonism, and is surely correct, but the attack on the Friends of the Forms is less easy to interpret. I pass over attempts to identify a renegade band of disciples whom Plato is here

bent on criticising. Plato is obviously discussing for some end or other his own Theory of Forms (cf. Cornford (2), pp. 242-8). Cornford's view is simply that the Theory in the Phaedo/Republic era postulated too narrow a conception of Reality, and that Plato takes this opportunity to widen it; the alteration is minor, and the choristic dualism carries on as before. From those who wish to defend the unity of Plato's thought, there have been no significant improvements on this view since.

This, however, is too narrow a conception of the Stranger's criticism; it overlooks the relation of the evaluation of the Idealists both to that of the Materialists, and to that of young Socrates' theory in the Parmenides. What happens in this passage is certainly that we get a new definition of Reality, of οὐσία but it is not the minor alteration to the earlier doctrine that Cornford imagines that it is. The whole concept of Reality as ἀκίνητόν is rejected, or rather, the distinction between ἀκίνητά, 'unchanging things' and κενήμενα, 'changing things' is now made within Reality. In other words, the ordinary physical world, the type of thing that the Materialists love, is now called real, even though it does not constitute the whole of Reality, and the ἀκίνητὰ εἶδη that the Friends of the Forms believe in are still real, but are not the whole of Reality either. One thing that Plato is on his guard against here is the possibility that the Forms might become unknowable; this, we remember, was also the burden of the criticism in the Mastership objection in the Parmenides. There, it was argued that a choristic dualism entailed that there could be no

cognitive awareness of those objects, on which, ex hypothesi, all true knowledge was based. Here, we have the suggestion that, if Reality is made logically equivalent with τὰ ἀκίνητα εἶδη, there will be no knowledge of Reality, for, for something to be known is for it to be κενεῖν . The two objections are closely connected, and are directed against the choristic dualism; the purpose of both objections is to argue that the terms on which the original dualism was set out make it impossible for it to provide the ultimate basis for all true knowledge, the very feat to perform which the Theory of Forms was designed. This, we have seen, is a characteristic logical feature of a choristic dualism; it was obviated in the middle dialogues by the soul with its mortal and immortal parts, but there were difficulties in that idea. After exposing by means of the TMAs in the Parmenides the problems of retaining the two worlds, though introducing a mediator, Plato now turns in the present passage to follow the alternative procedure of having the objects of reason and the objects of sense all in one ontological realm, with none of the 'philosophy is the preparation for death' theme of the earlier work. What is real now are the objects of sensible knowledge, the objects of intellectual knowledge and the various powers involved in playing an active and creative part in the game of life. Socrates talks in this context of the introduction of one world:-

"The sharp opposition between changeless Forms and changing objects, as if they belonged to two different worlds, and one was what the other was not, is apparently dropped--there is now only one world, a more complicated world than the old dualism suggested, with four principles that co-operate, the Formal principle,

Life, Soul and Intelligence."

(Scoon, pp. 131)

However, according to him, we still have no objects of sensible knowledge in this world, merely a larger assortment of higher entities. This makes it difficult to see how, on his terms, the dualism is dropped.

There is still room for further clarification of these developments. A superficial reading of the passage might lead one to argue that here Plato is abandoning the distinction between Becoming and Being and denying there is such a thing as unchanging reality at all. There are those who would interpret any suggestion that the Theory of Forms undergoes alteration along these lines. Cherniss and de Strycker are two such, who are anxious to see this bogey laid low. (The references are:- Cherniss (2), pp. 437-454, especially note 376; de Strycker (1), pp. 105, and (2), pp. 148-50; the latter is a reply to Solmsen, (cf. Solmsen, Cap V, especially pp. 77-82) who says that here 'a new concept of Being emerges..... the barrier between Being and Movement is broken down' (pp.79).) They argue as follows: Plato is not criticising the Theory of Forms for making the Forms unknowable, but some un-named (as usual!) disciples for confusing κίνησις ('kinesis') and γένεσις ('genesis'). In this passage, Plato proves the two are distinct, and that, while genesis cannot be admitted to the world of reality, kinesis not only can, but must be so admitted.

This comes about, because kinesis is a wider term than genesis; although the possession of kinesis in many ordinary senses

is a characteristic of entities in the world of becoming, the two concepts are not logically equivalent. There is a special sense of kinesis, in which it is a peculiar and a defining characteristic of soul and/or intelligence, such that, though it is necessary, on the one hand, for soul and intelligence to have this characteristic, in order for the Forms to become known, yet, on the other hand, the Forms can remain ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀκίνητά 'not acted upon and unchanged' while being acted upon by soul and intelligence in this fashion. "The κίνησις of νοῦς", says Cherniss, "is other than physical motion, so does not involve the alteration of its object" (ib., pp. 440, note 376). This is also the type of kinesis involved in the inter-communion, which is the focal point of the succeeding discussion in the Sophist.

Cherniss is perfectly right to point out that it is a mistake to equate kinesis and genesis even though the two are closely linked. But even so, this account contains difficulties. It must, firstly, be pointed out that, just as kinesis is not equivalent to physical change, genesis is not either. The metaphysical opposition of Being and Becoming is not a mere matter of the opposition of physical change and physical stability, even though the philosophical meaning of the words is as a matter of fact derived from the literal meaning, certainly in Heraclitus, and probably in Plato too. In all fairness to Cherniss, the point he is making is likely to be deeper than this, but it is ~~as~~ best to remove possible misinterpretations at an early stage. Taking Becoming in the metaphysical sense, it is still possible to argue that it and kinesis are not

equivalent, and that the separation of the two concepts is made explicit here. I hope, however, to show that this is done, and yet leave my argument about the lessons of this passage untouched.

What we now have, according to Cherniss, are unchanging Forms, changing particulars, and Soul, Life and Intelligence, which have a special sort of change, which enables the Forms to be known and yet remain unchanging. In other words, there is change and changelessness, with a special sort of change to unite the two. 'Special sorts' of intermediaries in a choristic dualism ought to make one suspicious anyway, and here one can base one's suspicions on something sound. Cherniss talks of this 'psychic' kinesis as acting on the Forms, but enabling them to remain ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀκίνητά. How something can παθεῖν and yet remain ἀπαθεῖς seems to me an insurmountable problem, for Plato is quite explicit that, in the act of being known, the Forms παθεῖν (248d11-e1). It is as contradictory to say they can be changed (κινεῖσθαι --248e3) and remain unchanged. Whatever else is said about the Forms, when they are known, they κινουῦνται 'are changed', and provision was not made for this in the middle dialogues.

What, however, looms Big Brother-like behind any discussion of these matters is the undeniable fact that Plato continued to maintain that there could be no knowledge of that which is always becoming, and that knowledge is always of that which remains constant. Given this, how is it possible, one might wonder, to suggest that he gave up thinking of the Forms as ἀκίνητά? The answer to this is that not only did Plato here disentangle κίνησις from γένεσις,

but he disentangled it from metaphysics entirely. Never again (as far as I can discover myself: Ast cites no instances*) does Plato refer to the objects of knowledge as ἀκίνητά; they are referred to as αἰ κατὰ ταῦτα, αἰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, both terms found in earlier dialogues, and also as βεβαύατα and οὐκ ὀλεθρον προσδεχόμενα, but never as ἀκίνητά. This is indicative of the fact that he has abandoned, not merely modified his choristic dualism, for it was a necessary part of that, that one world was ἀκίνητόν and the other κενήμενον. But, given an absolute division between the two, the unchanging world becomes unknowable, for to know is to change. To change by knowing is not to move, nor to reduce to becoming; the character of the Forms as absolute and stable concepts is not altered. However, once Plato thought he had to explain this stability in terms of a transcendent world of ἀκίνητὰ εἶδη, now the whole idea is rejected. It is not that in this passage, Plato juggles with the part played by kinesis in the Theory of transcendent Forms; he abandons kinesis as having a metaphysical role at all, and with it, the idea of the changing world of the senses as being outside reality. We are left with real concepts, and their real instantiations, all being in some sense 'in one world', even though true knowledge is only of the concepts. To get to this point, Plato certainly has to distinguish between Change and Becoming, but this is only half the picture--he also distinguishes Changelessness from Reality, and from conceptual absoluteness too. All this is indicative of Plato's ceasing to think of what is essentially a

*) Of course, they are called ἀκίνητά in the Timaeus, but then I am presuming it was not written after the Sophist.

harmless and viable logical distinction, between a concept and its instantiations, in terms of a vicious choristic dualism; I shall say more about this in the next chapter, when discussing genesis and ousia in the Philebus. This search for a complete definition of Reality represents some positive and productive self-criticism by Plato, highlighting some of the inadequacies that the Theory of transcendent Forms in reality possesses. When this is realised, the mysteries of the passage should be diminished.

CHAPTER VII

GENESIS AND OUSIA IN THE PHILEBUS.

It is of little value to argue that Plato abandoned his choristic dualism unless something is said about Cherniss' contention (cf. Cherniss (1), pp. 236-247) that it appears in dialogues avowedly late. The most important relevant passages are in the Philebus, where, amid an analysis of pleasure and the good life for man, there are several metaphysical excursūs, and in them, the concepts of γένεσις and οὐσία, 'Becoming' and 'Being', play a substantial role. In dealing with these, I must mention again a point which I brought up in my initial discussion of choristic dualisms (pp. 8). I said that it is possible to make conceptual distinctions between groups or kinds of entities, even to talk of knowing them in different ways, and do this in a logically aseptic fashion. Plato's Theory of Forms involves just such conceptual distinctions, but, as it appears in the middle dialogues, the combination of dualist ontology and dualist epistemology, with heavy emphasis on the χωρισμός, the mutual exclusion of the two elements, it is hardly logically aseptic. There are certain distinctions, of which the Theory of Forms is a representation, which are philosophically important; these can be maintained, without the trappings of a choristic dualism, with which they are initially adorned. What I shall argue that we find in the Philebus and other later remarks are references to these legitimate distinctions, which remain after the criticism of the paraphernalia of ontology is through.

It is very important to get this point clear, for it has caused, and very likely is still causing a great deal of confusion in regard to the question of the later development of Plato's thought, especially when that question is put, as it often is, in the crude form of 'Did Plato abandon the Theory of Forms?'. The Theory of Forms, as some time ago Cherniss (cf. Cherniss (4)) and more recently Moravscik (ib., pp. 53 ff.) have realised, is a theory of remarkable versatility. The simple question, 'Did Plato abandon it?', does not, therefore, admit of a simple answer, because Plato may have after a time distinguished between its aspects, and dropped some, while retaining others. If one operates within a frame-work, where this possibility is not accounted for, then complications will arise; this will be true, whether the answer that one offers be a simple affirmative or a simple negative. The dispute between the simple answers is radical, which suggests that to solve it, we might progress by denying that there must be a simple answer. I pass now to examine the Philebus passages with these considerations in mind; my treatment of them will be extended, because I feel that both sides have tended to make sweeping generalisations about what Plato is there saying, and not given the passages sufficient individual attention.

Moravscik distinguishes five roles which the Forms play, and argues that the net result of Parmenides' onslaught is that two of these remain in the later dialogues; firstly, that of a priori concepts, not dependent on the mind for their existence, and not derivable from sense-experience alone; secondly, that of concepts in general, similarly not mind-dependent. (cf. pp. 53-4, 60-1)

He nowhere cites passages in support of this assertion of survival; this is unfortunate, because it would require very detailed evidence to show that both these two closely-related conceptions survive in dialogues where Plato has little to say of a technical nature about these matters. The important survival, however, is the notion of a concept not mind-dependent; this I shall be concerned with, regardless as to whether the concepts in question are members of the wider or the narrower class. The thesis I shall argue concerning the Philebus is as follows: in the Theory of Forms of the middle dialogues, the distinction between a concept and its instantiation appeared as that between two ontologically and epistemologically distinct worlds, the former being not mind-dependent in virtue of its eternal, separate, self-sufficient existence. After the critique of this 'separatist' theory, the concept-instantiation distinction is retained, and the concept still regarded as not mind-dependent; the difference is that Plato is not prepared to give, as an explanation of this independence, that which he formerly gave, and indeed has no explanation of it at all.

The passages in the Philebus to which Cherniss refers are compatible with this account. Reference to a concept not mind-dependent can only entail reference to a transcendentally existing entity, if it is a datum that the only sort of existence possible independent of minds is a transcendent one. I shall suggest Plato came to realise the falsity of this last premiss, even though he never consciously formulated one to replace it. I have already

implied that it is a false premiss, and, most importantly, its falsity is quite compatible with the falsity of Nominalism. Cherniss can be wrong, without the later Plato being automatically made into a Nominalist, an extreme which I as much as Cherniss am anxious to avoid. The passages around which debate has specifically centered are 14c-17a, 23a-27c, 53c-55a, 59a-62a; Owen and Cherniss discuss all but the first (cf. Owen (1) and Cherniss (1)), while that is mentioned by Strang and Rees (vid. Bibliography). I shall discuss each of these in turn, before adding some further considerations of my own.

The first passage contains a discussion of the problem of the One and the Many; that is the same problem as the Theory of Forms was designed to solve, that of how a number of different particulars can be correctly termed instantiations of the same concept. Thus we still have the concept-instantiation distinction, and in 15a, it is carefully differentiated as a One/Many problem from that of how one particular can be one and yet have many parts. Rees (cf. Rees pp. 171) argues that this passage is evidence that Plato still at this time retained the dualism of the Theory of Forms; he is arguing against Strang's suggestion that he modified it after the TMA. I shall not discuss Strang's putative modification, that Plato merely abandoned calling the Forms paradigms, since the implication is that Strang has not seen how deep are the troubled waters here. If Rees is right, this counts in favour of Cherniss' thesis; I therefore need to show that Rees' claim is excessive.

In 15b, it is raised as an open question whether 'it should be suggested that there are Ones of this type which truly exist', τίνας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας; the further problem is raised that, given they exist, how can each exist μὴ γένεσιν προσδεχομένην , 'not admitting becoming', and yet ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις γίγνεσθαι 'come to be in entities themselves becoming'. Of course, it might be argued that these are purely and simply rhetorical questions, that Plato does not mean to imply either that there are no answers to these questions, or that he does not have the answers. The Platonist will know what is coming, he will realise that Plato is employing the device, which seems to be a favourite in the critical dialogues, of arguing for his Theory of Forms by stating things that are prima facie incompatible with it. But, in the light of the previous criticism of the Theory of Forms, coupled with the realisation (cf. Parm 135a-c) that the problem the Theory was designed to solve is the most fundamental problem of all, is it not conceivable that these questions are being asked sincerely, that they are a reference not to the validity, but the invalidity of the Theory of Forms? It is particularly significant that the second problem is exactly that around which the discussion in the critical dialogues is centered, of the relations between the two worlds.

These considerations are further strengthened by the fact that the solution of the problem of the One and the Many which Socrates goes on to propound is in terms of the Pythagorean Limit and Unlimited, and does not mention any of the key* vocabulary of

*) ἰδέα is used in 16d.

the Theory of Forms at all. There are references to Man, Ox, the Good and the Beautiful at 15a, and at 16d, these are stated to be capable of being subjected to a process that is similar to the method of division. But these entities are called $\mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\varsigma$, not $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$, as part of the general Pythagorean framework. Another significant point, after the restitution of one world in the Sophist, is that in 16d-17a, as part of the discussion of the One and the Many, the relations between concepts, particularly the genus-species relation, are treated on an ontological par with concept-instantiation relations; this is something which, as was shown in the Parmenides, was forbidden by the Theory of Transcendent Forms. Even though the main emphasis is on the former relations and the method of division, the heavy separation is gone. Commentators have discussed extensively and inconclusively the relation of this 'Pythagorean' talk to the supposed enduring belief in transcendent Forms; the simplest solution, since there is no obvious reference to the latter, is to assume that, as in the Theaetetus, he is trying to see how the problems that once they solved, can be dealt with, now that he no longer wishes to hypothesize that such entities exist.

At 23c, Socrates returns to metaphysics; 'all that now exists in reality' is analysed into four classes, Limit and Unlimited, the resultant mixture of them both, and the cause of that mixture. It is quite possible to argue, as Cherniss does, that here the phrase ' $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$ ' is not being used with any technical ontological overtones; he quotes Phaedo 78d-79a as containing a similar innocent usage rubbing shoulders with serious ontology. But, in a

case where the very point at issue is, Has Plato ceased to use τὰ ὄντα in a technical way or not?, this move is not legitimate. Here, he uses the phrase in a way which is incompatible with his earlier doctrine, and this prima facie counts in favour of the view that he has abandoned that doctrine. If there is sufficient independent evidence, as there is in the case of the Phaedo passage, that Plato is still using the technical vocabulary, then this instance in the Philebus can be accounted for. But when there are no counterbalancing instances, then this passage has to stand as evidence against Plato's retaining the ontology of the Theory of Forms. Cherniss' attempted way out entirely begs the question.

However, the mainstream of the discussion of this passage flows around the use of the phrase γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν at 26d8, and at 27b8 of γεγεννημένη οὐσία; οὐσίαις ascribed to entities in the phenomenal world, seen as the results of the process of the imposition of Limit on Unlimited. Owen (pp. 85, note 2) regards this as evidence that Plato has dropped a sharp division of Being and Becoming; Cherniss argues ((1), pp. 241) that this is just part of the 'paradox of Genesis', the paradox which, as we have seen, he mistakenly regards as vindicated in the Timaeus. If these phrases mean simply 'coming into existence', then they cannot be used to support any particular account of Plato's ontological leanings at this point. But they are used in a discussion of the ontological structure of the world, and in that context are incompatible, as Owen argues, with a choristic dualism. They fit well,

on the other hand, the Pythagorean-type metaphysics that Socrates is here trying out. Cherniss (ib.) finds parallels to these phrases in dialogues where the Theory of Forms is asserted, but this is irrelevant. If, as I am arguing, (a) these phrases are incompatible with the choristic dualism of the Theory of Forms, and (b) Plato, to start with, was blithely ignorant of this fact, then, in a way, it would be surprising if they or their kin were not found in the middle dialogues. Once again, the dispute leads ultimately back to the purely logical question of what is and is not permissible in a choristic dualism. It is an important part of what I am doing in this thesis both to bring out how much depends on this question, and that it has a clearly defined answer.

The next passage needs careful study, since it is manifest to Owen that Plato has here renounced the disjunction of genesis and ousia, and to Cherniss equally manifest that it is retained. The passage, 53c4-55c3, concerns the suggestion that pleasure is always genesis, and is never at all ousia (53c5); it is not stated where this suggestion comes from, but, since it results in the refutation of 'raw' Hedonism, Socrates remarks that we should be grateful to the subtle thinkers who made it. A distinction is made (53d3-4) between τὸ αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό , 'that which exists independently', and τὸ δὲ ἐπιέμενον ἄλλου , 'that which always looks to something else'. This is re-phrased at 53e5-7 as τὸ ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων δαί , 'that which always exists for the sake of some entity or other', and τὸ οὐ χαρὶν ἐκάστοτε τὸ τίνοσ ἕνεκα γιγνόμενον δαί γίγνεσθαι 'that for the sake of which each dependent entity comes to be, when it does come to be'. In modern jargon, Socrates distinguishes between things which exist

as means, and things which exist as ends, for the attainment of which the means come into being. At 54a5, genesis and ousia are stated to be a complementary pair of this type, and, obviously, the former looks towards the latter; 54c4, 'all becoming occurs as a means always to being'. This is then applied in the particular case of pleasure. If it is part of becoming, then there must be a being, as an end for which pleasure is the means. In such circumstances, the end is the Good; if the end is good, then the means cannot be too, for means and end are distinct. Pleasure therefore cannot be equated with the Good, and Hedonism, in this form fails. as Cherniss remarks, 54e1-55a11 is subsidiary argument, which is not important in the present context.

The main point of this argument, is ethical, not metaphysical; that much is perfectly clear. So we must be wary of building too large a metaphysical structure on this basis. Let us therefore proceed cautiously; the terms genesis and ousia are undoubtedly being used to make some logical distinction, but it is a long step from that to the assertion that the distinction is that between two ontological worlds, whatever linguistic similarities there are between this passage and passages in the middle dialogues. It is quite sufficient for Socrates' purposes here, for it to mark simply the distinction between means and ends, and the language used at 53d-e implies nothing more than this; it is only at 54a that genesis and ousia, those emotional catalysts, make their appearance. Why, then, does Socrates introduce those terms into the discussion? Because someone has once remarked that pleasure is a genesis, and Socrates sees a way of using that definition to produce another

refutation of Hedonism. We have still adequately explained these terms, without dragging in the Theory of Forms. But Cherniss might yet not be satisfied, for he quotes Lysis 218-220, where Plato uses an analogous argument 'to prove the existence of a real entity different from particular phenomena that are merely simulacra of it'. (cf. Cherniss (1), pp. 238) Can we use this as an inference-licence to the Theory of Forms? It is true that in the Lysis passage we find phrases like ὁ ὧς ἀληθῶς ἔστι φίλον, (219d4) and τὸ τῷ ὅντι φίλον (220e3), both forms of words which in the middle period are used of the Forms, and Cherniss cites both of these in his favour. But the force of those phrases in that context is nothing to do with the Form-particular distinction, nothing to do with the problem of the One and the Many; it is simply to refer to something which is not loved for the sake of something else, in contrast to, e.g., the medical art, which is loved for the sake of health (cf. 219a). That by itself is sufficient to undermine Cherniss' case, but there is also this further point. It is a notoriously dangerous proceeding to argue that the Theory of Transcendent Forms is found in the dialogues prior to the Phaedo, even though Plato uses in the 'Socratic' dialogues language similar to that which he uses in the middle dialogues; if Cherniss' argument is to get under way at all, he is committed to supporting this dangerous thesis. This he might be happy to do, but its truth needs to be shown, it cannot be presupposed. Even if Plato, in this part of the Lysis, is implying a concept/instantiation distinction, he need not, on a minimal interpretation, be implying a Form-particular distinction too.

I therefore conclude from this examination of 53c4-54d7, that it is unjustifiable to say that this entails that Plato still believed in the Theory of transcendent Forms. It is as unjustifiable, (in deference to Cherniss, this must be pointed out), for Owen to conclude that it proves Plato had abandoned his dualism. Questions of metaphysics and ontology are not being raised here in any form, or so the simplest interpretation of the text reveals. Even if there is the underlying insinuation that concepts are prior or superior to their instantiations, there is still yet another step from that to a putative reference to transcendent Forms. Despite the language used, this passage can help neither Cherniss nor Owen; from which is deducible the conclusion that I wish to draw, namely, that it cannot help Cherniss.

I pass finally to 59a-62a, the passage which Cherniss and those who share his opinions think is fatal to any suggestion that Plato did not retain the Theory of transcendent Forms. Owen, (pp. 85, note 2) argues that this disjunction here is not, as it is in the Timaeus, between that which changes and is not, and that which is and changes not, or rather, has not, does not and never will change. Cherniss replies (pp. 237, 243) that, on the contrary, the disjunction is exactly the same, since the Philebus contrasts the world of incessant becoming, and the world of τὰ ὄντα αἰεὶ which never changes. However, this reply is at cross-purposes with the point that Owen is making, even though a fair amount of the blame for this misunderstanding must attach to Owen. He mentions very abruptly, right at the end of a footnote, what is in fact the whole point on which his interpretation, and the conclusions that

he draws from it, depend.

In order to make more clear the case that Cherniss has to answer, I will unpack these cryptic remarks of Owen's as, it seems to me, they are meant to be unpacked. There are four elements in the analysis of being and becoming in the Timaeus, or, we may take it, any middle dialogue, eternal change and eternal changelessness, eternal reality and eternal appearance. These four are combined, such that whatever is real is also changeless, and whatever changes, never is but always becomes. However, it is little more than a dogma that whatever always changes is not real, the real being only the changeless; providing one does not make this ontological step, one can have a perfectly workable distinction between ὡσαύτως ὄντα αἰεί and γινόμενα, μὴ βέβαια. The state of absolute flux is still outside the pale of knowledge, according to Plato, but then what we have described in the Philebus as Becoming, is not the same thing as we have refuted in the Theaetetus. Plato still has the logical distinction, but this is no longer joined in a mésalliance with a dualist epistemology and ontology. This is a philosophically feasible position; as has been remarked already (pp.84), Plato can still perfectly well retain the distinction by using the terms genesis and ousia, without anything undesirable creeping in. He can also claim that knowledge of concepts is superior to knowledge of particulars, without any regrettable implications; after all, any philosopher who does not is denigrating his own enquiry! What is another matter is to adduce evidence to show that this is happening in the Philebus; to this I now turn.

This part of the Philebus is a discussion of knowledge, in parallel to that just given of pleasure. Just as it is an oversimplification to say that pleasure is the good, so it is also one to say that knowledge is the good; for there are different types of knowledge, and some are more meritorious than others. In 55 and 56, τέχναι 'skills' and ἐπιστήμαι 'branches of knowledge' are used interchangeably for the different types of knowledge; the types are put on a continuum of precision, and, at 57dl, the philosophers' knowledge is at the highest extreme. That certainly echoes Plato's earlier view, which was an integral part of the Theory of Forms, but the approach is surely significantly different. Before, the knowledge of the philosopher was not only the highest form, it was the only form. Here, as 56b6, building, medicine and mathematics are all referred to as ἐπιστήμαι as well as dialectic, whereas, previously, only the latter merited that title. When discussing Dialectic in the Republic (533d4-e2), Plato points out apologetically that he has on occasions used ἐπιστήμη loosely to refer to τέχναι, but that, strictly speaking, this was philosophically mistaken. It is possible to argue that here we have 'just a non-technical use', but I have already exposed that move as unhelpful (pp. 89-90). The breaking-down of the radical and absolute distinction between the knowledge of the philosopher, and that of other claimants to the title of ἐπιστημῶν 'one who has knowledge' is compatible with, if not also indicative of, Plato's later unwillingness to think in terms of exclusive dichotomies. The distinction between dialectic and other branches of knowledge is simply that between philosophy as the study of concepts and

what, in modern jargon, might be called 'first-order enquiries'; this can be made quite independently of any theories as to the ontological status of the objects that the philosopher is concerned with.

At 58a2-3, dialectic is spoken of as being about τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτον ἀεὶ κερυκός, 'that which is, which exists in reality, ever unchanged', in contrast to the subject-matter of other branches of knowledge; at 59a1, most arts are said to 'pursue matters in the realm of opinion', and shortly after, such pursuits are stated to be not περὶ τὰ ὄντα, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γαυνησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα, 'not to do with reality, but with things that are coming to be, will do so, and have come to be'. There then follows the assertion that, if there is no permanent standard at all, there can be no knowledge; for there can be no knowledge of that which is always impermanent. The point is then made again that the Good Life is a mixture, and the debate moves on to the question, What types of knowledge are to be part of the mixture? There is (61e1) one knowledge of things that come to be and perish, and one of things which do not do this, but always remain the same, and both types are needed in the Good Life (62d1).

We are being asked by Cherniss to recognise that here we have an undoubted reference to the theory of transcendent Forms, but that is not at all obvious, on a minimal interpretation of the passage. The argument that Plato is putting forward here is simply that there must be some objective standard of reference, if there

is to be knowledge; this point is purely logical, and absolutely correct. It is another matter altogether, to assert that these objective standards are paradigms, existing in a transcendent world of their own, unseen by mortal eye. Owen's point is that Plato, or anyone else, can take the one step, without being in any way forced to take the other; if this were not true, the history of philosophy would be littered with transcendentalists, from Aristotle onwards. The language that Plato uses here is quite compatible with his only wishing to make the narrower claim. When the point at issue is whether he has ceased to make the wider claim, then, as before, his use of this language cannot be held to entail that he is making that claim; to think that it does is to beg the question.

This point can be considered from another angle. Why, in the middle dialogues, was Plato led to postulate a second, separate world of transcendent forms? Certainly, part of the reason was that he was convinced there must be objective standards of reference, particularly for moral terms, but that was only part of the reason. Heavily influenced by what he took to be the import of Heraclitean metaphysics, (cf. Aristotle, Met A, 987a29-b10), he thought that the sensible world, and the particulars in it, could not be the objects of knowledge, because they were always changing. In the Philebus, we still have the idea that there can be no knowledge of that which is always changing, and also the idea that true philosophical knowledge is of universal concepts; but the sensible world is not now always changing, as it was before, even though knowledge of a sense-particular is distinguished from knowledge of a concept; even

though, also, knowledge of a sense-particular is still only possible insofar as precision is present in that knowledge, precision of measurement and number, which entails some degree of abstract thinking. The sensible world, although still distinguished from the world of concepts (if I can use that form of words without undermining my entire thesis!), is not any more equated with the world of absolute change, no knowledge of which is possible. We still have some of the distinctions that were marked by the theory of Forms, but not all of them, not the ones Plato dispensed with in the critical dialogues.

Another point which tells against Cherniss' argument is Plato's final conclusion that practical skills not only are a form of knowledge, but also are necessary ingredients in the good life; in 62a, one who has only the theoretical knowledge, the knowledge of the higher stages of the line, is ridiculed. This is another notion which the Plato of the Phaedo would have found abhorrent. Hackforth, (cf. ib., pp. 127) faced with this problem, says that the lower types of knowledge are admitted 'out of regard for the needs of practical life'. This is true, but does this not carry with it the implication that Plato has ceased his other-worldly ethical ideas, with the further implication that he has ceased to believe in his other world? When, in the Republic, he was faced with the matter of the good life in practical terms, he hedged, (cf. 516e2-517a6) saying that the man who had seen the sun would probably be laughed at when he returned into the Cave, but this was not an occasion for regret. Now, it would be regrettable;

this is the inference we are to draw from the notion that some practical skills are necessary.

I make my final appeal to the whole tenor of the teaching of the dialogue. The final conclusion that the good life is a mixture of good pleasures of various sorts, and of different types of knowledge is not a conclusion to which the Plato of the middle dialogues would have come, despite the relative superiority of reason, and the concession to rational processes implied in the emphasis on measure and proportion. A Plato who thought always in terms of dichotomies would never have given pride of place to a mixture. Obviously, that he rejected one dichotomy does not by itself prove that he rejected any others; but where there is a possibility that he did, it can, I think, be suggested that it strengthens that possibility.

I therefore conclude that an examination of the Philebus produces no proof that Plato still believed in a separate world of transcendent Forms, even though it does show that Plato still is making some distinctions which, as a matter of contingent fact, he marked earlier by the theory of transcendent forms. Given independent proof that Plato still believed in the two worlds, then some explanation can be found to make all the Philebus passages compatible with that assertion; the dialogue is not, however, itself the independent proof that Cherniss takes it to be. At the very least, it is ambivalent, but even that is significant; there are a few other indications that it is not ambivalent, to the detriment of Cherniss' thesis.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, I shall offer a summary of the argument that I have been following. My thesis has been that it is possible to trace a consistent line of development of Plato's later concern with the nature of Reality and Knowledge, basing this on an original principle of interpretation. This principle is that the Theory of Forms, being a choristic dualism, has the typical faults of any such theory; Plato himself exposes these faults in the critical dialogues, and does not attempt to use the device of a choristic dualism again.

The faults in question can be schematised in the following way:-

- (a) If the two worlds are absolutely separate, then there can be no interaction between them.
- (b) If they are not separate, then there are no longer two worlds, but one.
- (c) If the attempt is made to keep them separate and yet joined by means of a bridge-entity, then either
 - (i) the problem is reduplicated ad infinitum
 - or
 - (ii) there are reasons for suggesting the original problem is dissolved.

Having shown that in the Timaeus there are confusions directly attributable to the choristic nature of the metaphysics involved, I then turned to the critical dialogues, and the criticism of the Theory of Forms there. The Mastership objection in the Parmenides (esp. 134a3-e8), and the admission in the Sophist of the 'strangeness'

of banning life, soul and intelligence from the world of Reality, suggest Plato's awareness of point (a). The outcome of the discussion with the Materialists and Idealists, and the subsequent account of the 'interweaving of Forms' in the Sophist suggest the second point (b). The two TMAs in the Parmenides, as analysed in Chapter 2, are ample proof of Plato's concern with (c.1). This only leaves (c.11) unaccounted for, but this idea is primarily an insight of Wittgenstein and Wisdom (cf. Bambrough (1), esp. pp. 103-4) and depends fairly heavily on their conception of philosophical enquiry; it is not therefore surprising that Plato did not follow up this point. I have finally shown that there is no evidence at all in the metaphysical doctrine of the Philebus to show that Plato still believed in the choristic Theory of Forms at that stage in his life. It is undeniably true that there is much in the critical dialogues that remains to be related to this general pattern, but I have been dealing here with the passages that are most obviously relevant to this question. Owen (cf. Owen (1), pp. 79) talks of the paradoxes involved in claiming that Plato continued to his dying day to believe in transcendent Forms, and says

"No one familiar with Platonic scholarship will claim that these paradoxes could not be explained away, given enough ingenuity. But I think that, once they are seen in aggregate, the cost in such ingenuity should seem quite exorbitant."

I have been attempting to demonstrate that not only ingenuity, but also an ignorance, wilful or otherwise, of the philosophical issues involved is needed. In so doing, the cost appears higher even than Owen sets it; I hope that I have priced such interpretations out of the market.

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APPENDIX I:- THE 'CRATYLUS'

I have not mentioned at all the relevance of the Cratylus and the evidence that it provides; this is a fairly complicated issue. There are two passages, 389a5-390e4 and 439b10-end, where Socrates leaves questions of etymology and meaning, and makes some reference to metaphysical matters; the language used is exactly that which would make the Cratylus relevant to the issues under consideration in this thesis, the language of genesis and ousia, of the stable realm of knowledge, and the unstable world of belief. However, notoriously, the date of the Cratylus is itself a matter of some dispute, as is also the question of what precisely Socrates is saying in his metaphysical moments. Owen and Cherniss both assume that the dialogue is to be dated with the critical dialogues, but Owen maintains that the metaphysics is post-Parmenidean (cf. Owen (1), pp. 85, note 6), while Cherniss maintains that it is the same as the Theory of Forms (cf. Cherniss (1), pp. 243-7).

Ross, on the other hand, argued a decade ago (vid. Ross (2)), that the traditional dating of the dialogue, in the middle period, is to be preferred, basing his conclusion on a critical evaluation of von Arnim's argument from stylometry. Insofar as he mentions metaphysical considerations, he talks of an early, uncomplicated version of the Theory of Forms (ib., pp. 194-5). Recently, in two separate articles (vid. Luce (1) and (2)) J.V. Luce has supported this account, and further specified the dialogue as being at the very beginning of the middle period, before the Phaedo. Part of his evidence for this is the metaphysical content of the dialogue;

he argues that the Forms, although considered logically distinct, are not yet separate, as they are in the fully-fledged dualism of the Theory of Forms in the Phaedo and Republic.

This is not the place for a detailed evaluation of Luce's views, but he does produce some very persuasive arguments in their favour. If he is correct on all points, then what is said in the Cratylus is not relevant to my thesis. But, more interestingly, his exposition of the metaphysical doctrine of the dialogue is perfectly compatible with it being a dialogue of the critical period, if Plato's thought developed as I have argued: exactly that which, according to Luce, we find in the Cratylus, is a doctrine of concepts as logically, but not ontologically distinct entities, χωριστὰ εἶδη, and exactly that is what, on my thesis, we find in the later period.

The only terms on which the Cratylus would produce conclusive evidence against my thesis are these. Firstly, it would have to be shown that the metaphysical content of the dialogue is the same as the dualistic Theory of Forms. Secondly, it would have to be shown without reference to the metaphysical content that the dialogue had to be dated in the critical period. Neither of these conditions has yet been fulfilled. I accept, as a matter of fact, Luce's thesis about the date and his interpretation of the metaphysical doctrine, and I wish to make clear that he has to be shown wrong on both counts independently, before I have anything to which to reply.

APPENDIX II:- PASSMORE ON THE THEORY OF FORMS

I have not followed exactly the same line as Passmore on the invalidity of the Theory of Forms as a choristic dualism, because I think that he is muddled in his treatment. I must acknowledge specifically here the help of Prof. John Malcolm in drawing my attention to this point, and discussing it at length with me; I do not wish to commit him to agreeing with everything that I say about the matter here. There are two quite distinct TWAs that, in theory at any rate, can be brought to bear against the Theory of Forms. The first might be termed epistemological, and is that which I have been concerned with in the thesis. The second, one might term ontological; this takes the form of arguing that Plato is not merely in broad outline involved in the same difficulties as Descartes, as I argued above, but is involved in precisely the same difficulties. Just as Descartes' pineal gland had to be either thinking or extended substance, and so could not even putatively perform the role of bridge-entity, so Plato's soul must be either a Form or a particular, and thus similarly restricted. This is certainly neither the same argument as the first, even though it shares the common general structure, nor logically derivable from it; Passmore, on the other hand (cf. pp. 44) appears to assume one or the other of these possibilities to be the case, for he offers the two arguments as a package deal.

It is perfectly possible for the soul not to be considered as an object of knowledge, for it not to be forced into the category

either of Form or particular, for it figures in the Theory of Forms as a cognitive agent, not the object of a cognitive act; Plato's ontology, however, applies only to the objects of the cognitive acts of knowledge and belief. Where Plato runs into trouble is in arguing that there are two quite distinct cognitive acts for each of these two ontological realms, and it is at that point that the role of the soul becomes evident.

In order to saddle Plato with liability to the Cartesian dilemma, one would need explicit evidence from the dialogues to show that Plato thought of the soul as an object of a cognitive act, as well as a cognitive agent, and I have been able to find no such passages. What seems to be an attractive possibility is the passage in the Timaeus, where Plato describes the creation of the world-soul, Timaeus 35a1-b3. It is formed from a mixture, and from what is left from this mixture, the immortal part of each human soul is formed (ib., 41d4-9). Cornford translates the start of the creation as follows:- "Between the Indivisible Existence that is ever in the same state, and the Divisible Existence that becomes in bodies, he compounded a third form of Existence, composed of both". This procedure the Demiurge now repeats with Divisible and Indivisible Sameness and Difference. Then the world-soul is formed from the three intermediates themselves mixed together.

Given Cornford's interpretation of the symbolism, "The World-soul and all individual souls belong to both worlds, and partake of both being and becoming" (Cornford (3), pp. 63), Plato

might be in difficulties, but is Cornford necessarily correct? Plato could be defended, on the grounds that there is a distinction between an ontological εἶναι and an existential one; that when he says that the Forms, particulars and soul exist, this is in no way an infringement on his ontological dualism, because still only the Forms are real. This sort of defence could also be put up to other possible additional entities in the dualism, such as the Demiurge and the Receptacle of Becoming in the Timaeus. Concerning the latter, Plato quite explicitly differentiates it from the objects of belief and of knowledge, remarking that we appreciate it 'by a kind of bastard reasoning' (ib., 52b2). One might also argue that, in one sense of it, the 'paradox of Genesis' is explicable in these terms; 'Genesis exists' is permissible, though of course 'Genesis is real' is not. However, these possibilities I evaluate at the end of the third chapter.

What is perhaps debatable, is how far Plato himself was aware of this attack and defence; the distinction made in the case of the Receptacle may be indicative that he was. On the other hand, he does not make any attempt to unravel the ambiguities of εἶναι until the Sophist, and one of the ambiguities he there proudly lays bare is that between the existential and ontological senses. The whole issue of Plato's uses of εἶναι and its cognates in the middle and late dialogues is still shrouded in comparative mystery, despite the efforts of many recent commentators. A fully comprehensive account of the logic of the Theory of Forms must include an examination of all of these points; the territory

covered by this thesis is less wide.

What is certain is that in the arguments with which Plato himself explicitly evaluated the Theory of Forms, there is no mention of the Cartesian dilemma, and it is with what is in the pages of the critical dialogues that I am concerned here. It is sufficient for my thesis that I establish that there is a TWA of some sort to be met, provided that I outline carefully its similarities to and differences from other versions of the same argument. This I claim to have done.

B29839